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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(J) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are present in this appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court correctly interpreted § 73-4-11 of the Utah Code. "A trial 
court's determination of the law is reviewed under a correctness standard; [the reviewing 
court] afford[s] no degree of deference to a trial judge's determination of the law." United 
States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co,, 2003 UT 49, f 9, 79 P.3d 945; Jeffs v. 
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
2. Whether the trial court developed an appropriate equitable remedy in its decision 
regarding the State Engineer's motion to dismiss. On appeal, '"a trial court is accorded 
considerable latitude and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy,' and 
will not be overturned unless it abused its discretion." Id, (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 892 P.2d 1034,1041 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citing LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 
961, 963 (Utah 1988); Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981))). 
3. Whether the district court properly allowed the Green River Canal Company 
("Canal Company") to amend its objection to the State Engineer's proposed determination 
in the general adjudication pursuant to § 73-4-10 of the Utah Code. According to this court, 
"[t]he granting or denial of leave to amend a pleading is within the broad discretion of the 
trial court, and [this court] will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of an abuse of that 
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005 1 
discretion." Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ^ 31, 84 P.3d 1154; 
accord R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The plain language of three Utah statutes is determinative. Section 73-4-3 of the Utah 
Code states in part as follows: 
as soon as [the survey of the water source] has been completed, 
the state engineer shall file notice of completion with the clerk 
and give notice by registered mail or by personal service to all 
claimants whose names appear on the list that the survey has 
been completed and that their claims are due within 90 days 
from the date of notice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3 (1989) (attached as Addendum A). Section 73-4-10 of the Utah 
Code states as follows: 
The court shall have power to allow amendments to any petition, 
statement or pleading; to extend as provided in this title the time 
for filing any statement of pleading, statement, report or protest. 
Id. at § 73-4-10 (attached as Addendum B). Section 73-4-11 of the Utah Code states in part 
as follows: 
After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the 
surveys, records, and files, and after a personal examination of 
the river system or water source involved, if such examination 
is deemed necessary, the state engineer shall formulate a report 
and a proposed determination of all rights to the use of the 
water of such river system or water source, and a copy of the 
same shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant with 
notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety 
days from such date of mailing file with the clerk of the district 
court a written objection thereto duly verified on oath. 
Id. at § 73-4-11 (attached as Addendum C). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter arises out of the general adjudication initiated on March 15, 1956, to 
determine the various rights to the use of water in the Lower Green River and the Price River 
Drainage areas. (R. 1 :i, R. 161.) On May 1,1972, the State Engineer completed a Proposed 
Determination of Water Rights in the Price River and Lower Green River Drainage (Area 
Code Nos. 91 and 92) ("Proposed Determination") containing his recommendations 
regarding all the claims to water, including the Canal Company, in the named drainage areas. 
(R. 1 :iii.) Shortly after receiving the Proposed Determination, the Canal Company submitted 
an obj ection to the State Engineer's recommendation concerning the Canal Company's Water 
User's Claim. (R. 37.) The Canal Company filed amendments to its initial objection in 1993 
and 1999. (R. 6, 39, 42.) This interlocutory appeal arises out of the district court's denial 
of the State Engineer's motion to dismiss the Canal Company's objection. 
]In a recent decision, Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, 84 P.3d 
1134 (hereinafter Green River), this Court reviewed a district court's decision regarding a 
contract matter between the Canal Company and Lee Thayn. Although the issues and 
adverse parties were distinct from this case, this Court commented on facts at issue in this 
case. In Green River, this Court noted that the Canal Company "has never filed an objection 
to the proposed determination," that the Canal Company "has long acquiesced in the State 
Engineer's proposed determination," and that the Canal Company "has recently asked the 
State Engineer to modify the proposed determination, [but] . . . was denied." Id. at j^ 31. 
These statements reflect on the central issues of this appeal but conflict directly with the 
undisputed facts and the district court's February 7,2003 Memorandum Decision holding the 
Canal Company's objections timely, from which this appeal was taken. However, these 
statements in Green River should not be considered to have resolved the questions presented 
in this case because they were never a part of that litigation. Instead, these statements 
illustrate this Court's recognition that "the prosecution of an independent action" outside of 
the general adjudication can result in judgments inconsistent with decisions in the general 
adjudication. United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irr. Co., 2003 UT 49, % 12, 
79P.3d945. 
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THE CANAL COMPANY'S WATER USER CLAIM AND OBJECTION 
In 1880, the settlers of Green River City began constructing diversion facilities on the 
Green River. The Canal Company was formally incorporated in 1904 to serve those same 
farms and numerous residents within Green River City. (R. 60.) The Canal Company filed 
a Statement of Water Users Claim to Diligence Rights on June 18, 1952, stating it was 
diverting 20 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water on a year-round basis for stockwatering 
(directly out of the canal and by a few outlets that could access water at that level), plus an 
additional 60 cfs during the irrigation season for a total diversion of 80 cfs, thereby 
memorializing the diversion and use of water it had historically made since 1880. See 
Statement of Water User's Claim to Diligence Rights, 1 (attached as Addendum D). Until 
1997, the Water Code specified that diligence claims such as the one filed by the Canal 
Company constituted "prima facie evidence of claimed right or rights therein described." 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-13(1989) (attached as Addendum E). Their pre-1903 use under this 
diligence claim legally entitled the Canal Company to 80 cfs during the irrigation season.2 
The terrain crossed by the Canal Company's canal is virtually flat, which reduces the 
flow rate, allows silt in the water to settle out, and is the cause of the Canal Company's need 
for 80 cfs. (R. 61.) The Green River is extremely silt laden, and silt continuously builds up 
on the bottom of the canal. (R. 156.) The Canal Company has maintained and operated the 
canal for over 100 years by constant "sluicing," i.e., regularly opening sluice gates along the 
2The phrase "diligence claim" comes from the fact that, prior to 1903, there was no 
application process in Utah, and water rights were acquired by diversion and beneficial use. 
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canal to flush out the silt buildup one section at a time. (R. 61.) Before the district court, the 
Canal Company presented an undisputed affidavit by Jack A. Barnett, P. E., indicating that 
the canal must be flowing at full capacity, i.e. 80 cfs, in order to function properly. See 
Barnet Affidavit, f 4 (R. 156; attached as Addendum F.) The Barnett Affidavit specifies that 
without sluicing, the silt settles in the canal and slows down the flow of water. See id. at \ 
5. (R. 156.) All non-consumed water flows back into the Green River.3 (R. 60.) 
In its Statement of Water User's Claim, submitted in the general adjudication on 
November 6, 1969, the Canal Company indicated that it had a right to the beneficial use of 
surface water of the Green River. (R. 81, attached as Addendum G.) The Canal Company's 
statement described the nature of the water right as 60 cfs (cubic feet per second) used for 
irrigation purposes from March 15 to November 1 and 20 cfs used for stockwatering 
purposes from January 1 to December 31. {Id.) Additionally, the Canal Company's Water 
User's Claim indicated that these amounts included water used for domestic purposes from 
January 1 to December 31. {Id.) 
After receiving and compiling water user claims from claimants along the Price and 
Green rivers, the State Engineer produced his Proposed Determination on May 1, 1972, and 
began distributing it. (R. 1 :iii.) The Proposed Determination noted in its introduction that 
"the diversion requirements have been considered to be 4.00 acre feet per acre per calendar 
3This Court has twice held that using water to transport other water for irrigation 
purposes is a beneficial use so long as the carrier water is returned th the natural stream. See 
East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449, 455 (1954); Jackson 
v. Spanish Fork West FieldIrr. Co., 119 Utah 32, 35, 235 P.2d 918, 919 (1951). 
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year, regardless of the source of supply." (R. l:ii.) In Book 5 of the proposed 
determination, the State Engineer wrote that the Canal Company could use 60 cfs of water 
for irrigation purposes from April 1 to October 31 and that it could use 20 cfs of water for 
stockwatering and domestic use from November 1 to March 31. (R. 1:1143) He also noted 
in a footnote that "From April 1 to October 31, inclusive, flow for stockwatering and 
domestic is part of flow for irrigation." (Id.) This footnote is the first and only indication that 
despite its 1952 diligence claim and its 1969 Water User's Claim, the State Engineer believed 
the Canal Company was only entitled to divert a total of 60 cfs during the irrigation season. 
According to the State Engineer, Delbert Tidwell, secretary of the Canal Company, 
picked up a copy of Book 5 and signed a document entitled "Notice Receipt and Waiver" on 
December 15, 1972. (R. 37) Whether or not Mr. Tidwell actually did so cannot be 
ascertained as Mr. Tidwell is deceased and unavailable to testify. (R.145.) On June 8,1973, 
John Vetere, president of the Canal Company signed an objection that was stamped filed with 
the Seventh District Court on June 20, 1973. (R. 3.) The Canal Company protested the 
period of irrigation use recommended by the State Engineer. (Id.) Instead of irrigation being 
pemiitted from April 1 to October 31, the Canal Company requested the period "be at least 
March 15 to November 15." (Id.) The State Engineer did not contest this objection until 
October 31, 2000, when it moved to dismiss the objection as untimely. (R. 31.) According 
to the State Engineer's calculation, this objection was 97 days late. See Appellant Brief, 9. 
On June 18,1993, the Canal Company submitted two subsequent amendments to its 
initial objection. (R. 39, 42.) In one of these amendments, the Canal Company requested 
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that "Green River City's claim and water right under 91-39 . . . be declared invalid because 
Green River City has failed to apply the water to beneficial use." (R. 40.) In the other 
amendment, the Canal Company requested that "[diversion duty for irrigation water rights 
in the Green River area, including Green River Canal Company's water right under 91-294, 
. .. be set at 6.00 acre feet per acre per calendar year." (R. 43.) The State Engineer did not 
respond to these amendments until October 31, 2000.4 (R. 31.) 
The Canal Company filed the last supplement to its initial objection on October 14, 
1999. (R. 6.) This supplement sought the removal of the language in the State Engineer's 
footnote concerning the Canal Company's water user claim in the Proposed Determination 
that "[fjrom April 1 to October 31, inclusive, flow for stockwatering and domestic is part of 
flow for irrigation." (R. 1:1143.) By including stockwatering and domestic water with 
irrigation water, the State Engineer "effectively reduce[d] the Canal Company's diversion 
rights during the irrigation season from 80 cfs to 60 cfs total... rendering] the canal system 
incapable of delivering irrigation water to all of its shareholders which it has historically been 
able to do." (R. 8.) As with Canal Company's previous submissions, the State Engineer did 
not respond at all until October 31, 2000. (R. 31.) 
4The State Engineer has recently increased the irrigation duty from four acre feet to 
six acre feet, validating the Canal Company's position. See Appellant Brief lOn.l. See also 
First Addendum to the Proposed Determination of Water Rights Price River and Lower 
Green River Drainage, dated April 4, 2003 ("In response to certain objections to the 
Proposed Determination regarding duty, the State Engineer has re-evaluated the duty in Area 
91.") (attached as Addendum H). Though not part of the record, this Court may take judicial 
notice of this document. See infra n.2. Such action is consistent with his historic practice 
of considering meritorious objections filed outside the initial ninety-day objection period. 
(R. 149 ) 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On October 31, 2000, the State Engineer filed a motion to dismiss the Canal 
Company's objection to the proposed determination and its subsequent amendments, on the 
sole ground that the objection was filed outside the ninety-day objection period established 
in § 73-4-11 of the Utah Code. (R. 31-32.) Responding to this motion, the Canal Company 
asked the district court to exercise its authority under § 73-4-10 of the Utah Code to extend 
the time for the Canal Company to file its objection and allow it to be heard on the merits. 
The Canal Company argued that the State Engineer's extraordinary twenty-seven year dely 
in bringing the motion to dismiss justified the application of the equitable doctrines of laches 
or waiver, and that the State Engineer's actions violated the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution and the uniform operations of law clause of the Utah Constitution. (R. 
64-72.) In addition to responding to the State Engineer's motion, the Canal Company 
submitted an alternative motion to dismiss the entire general adjudication for failure to 
prosecute or to extend the time for filing objections. (R. 58, 74.) Following oral arguments 
and extensive briefing by both parties, the district court denied both parties' motions on 
February 7,2003 "except to the extent that this Court's interpretation of the statutory scheme 
allows additional time to file the objection herein." (R. 443-44.) 
In its memorandum decision, the district court compared the language of §§ 73-4-3 
and 73-4-11 of the Utah Code. (R. 439-440.) Section 73-4-3 requires the State Engineer to 
give notice of the completion of the State Engineer's water survey "by registered mail or by 
personal service" to all claimants involved in the general adjudication. Utah Code Ann. § 
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73-4-3 (1989). On the other hand, § 73-4-11 requires the State Engineer "mail[] by regular 
mail" notice and a copy of the proposed determination to all claimants. Id. at § 73-4-11. 
Looking to the plain language of these sections, the district court determined that "the 
Legislative Scheme was and is purposeful - and the Legislature had a reason(s) for drafting 
the disparate language in" §§ 73-4-3 and 73-4-11. (R. 442) Thus, the district court held that 
§73-4-11 required the State Engineer to mail the proposed determination and that the 90-day 
period should not run "until all claimants receive the necessary notice" by mail (R. 440.) 
Based on this determination, the district court, invoking equitable powers, attempted 
to "construe the statutes to do the least harm possible and by so doing . . . serve the equitable 
position that all parties deserve their legitimate day in Court." (R. 442.) Thus, the district 
court held as follows: 
If all objectors/claimants are to be treated fairly, then all 
claimants should have 90 days to present their objections under 
73-4-11, and I believe that period should be computed using the 
date of the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver which 
is on file herein which affects each area. With regard to area 
#91,1 conclude that to be June 4, 1974, which is the date of the 
last dated Waiver by Joseph Novak. 
(R. 442-443 (emphasis in original).) Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the 
district court further stated: 
I believe equitably speaking, the delay in raising the defense 
which the State Engineer's Office now attempts to raise by its' 
[sic] Motion to Dismiss gives me equitable grounds for allowing 
the proceedings to go forward and to treat the Green River 
Canal's objection as being timely filed and further treating the 
"supplementalfilingsff by that company as merely amendments 
and/or specifications to the original filing. 
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(R. 443.) Because the district court denied its motion to dismiss, the State Engineer filed a 
petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. (R. 447.) 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
For the Court's convenience, the following is a chronology of significant events 
pertaining to both the Canal Company's water right and the general adjudication: 
Date 
June 18, 1952 
March 20, 1956 
Nov. 6, 1969 
May 1, 1972 
Dec. 15, 1972 
June 8, 1973 
June 18, 1993 
June 18, 1993 
Oct. 13,1999 
Oct. 31,2000 
Feb. 7, 2003 
Event 
Canal Company memorialized its 1880 Diligence Claim 
General Adjudication begun by Order of Court 
Canal Company submits Water User Claim 91-294 
State Engineer completes the Proposed Determination 
Delbert Tidwell purportedly picks up copy of the proposed 
determination and signs the "Notice Receipt and Waiver" 
Canal Company files initial objection to the Proposed 
Determination 
Canal Company files a supplemental objection to declare 
Green River City's claim invalid 
Canal Company files a supplemental objection to increase 
the duty to six acre feet 
Canal Company files a final supplemental objection to delete 
the footnote 
State Engineer files a motion to dismiss Canal Company's 
"late" objection and amendments 
Judge Halliday's Memorandum Decision issued 
Record 
Ad. 4 
R l : i 
R.81 
R. l:iii 
R. 37 
R. 3 
R.40 
R. 43 
R. 8 
R. 32 
R.444 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the district court's ruling for three reasons. First, unlike the 
State Engineer's mischaracterization of the memorandum decision, the district court properly 
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interpreted § 73-4-11. The plain language of § 73-4-11 requires that the State Engineer 
"mail[] by regular mail" a copy of the Proposed Determination to each claimant. According 
to the statute, each claimant then has "ninety days from such date of mailing" to file a written 
objection. Because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court should 
affirm the memorandum decision of the district court. Although the State Engineer argues 
that the Canal Company waived its right to such notice, the district court never made a 
finding of waiver, and, in any event, the waiver should not be binding under the 
circumstances of this case. 
Second, the district court properly exercised its discretion in crafting an equitable 
remedy to address the facts of this case. Because the State Engineer chose not to act in 
accordance with the statute, the district court determined that the ninety-day period should 
run from the date the State Engineer last gave notice to any claimant of Book 5 of the 
Proposed Determination. The district court's decision to fashion an equitable remedy in the 
face of over twenty-seven years of unexplained and unexcused delay and inaction by the 
State Engineer was proper and should be affirmed.5 
Finally, even if the district court incorrectly interpreted § 73-4-11 or improperly 
crafted an equitable remedy, the memorandum decision should still be affirmed because § 
73-4-10 allows district courts to extend the time for filing objections to the Proposed 
Determination. Even if, arguendo, § 73-4-10 did not apply, the equitable doctrines of laches 
5The State Engineer only states that "general water right adjudications take a long 
time." Appellant Brief, 6. He does not even attempt to explain why he waited twenty-seven 
years to bring a motion to dismiss the Canal Company's objection. 
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or waiver are appropriate alternative bases upon which to affirm the district court's ruling 
because of the State Engineer's inaction for over twenty-seven years. 
In addition, this Court should also affirm the district court's decision to deem the 
Canal Company's supplements to its initial objection as amendments that relate back to the 
initial objection for the determination of timely filing.6 Section 73-4-10 grants district courts 
the authority to permit amendments to objections in general adjudications. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED § 73-4-11. 
In its memorandum decision, the district court interpreted § 73-4-11 of the Utah Code 
to require all claimants to receive notice of the State Engineer's proposed determination by 
mail. (R. 440.) The district court noted the undisputed fact that "[t]he State Engineer did not 
mail by regular mail to the Green River Canal Company a Notice of Proposed 
Determination." (R. 440.) In its brief, the State Engineer contends that the Canal Company 
waived its right to receive notice by mail and that the Canal Company submitted its objection 
more than ninety days from the date it received actual notice of the proposed determination. 
However, a plain language analysis of § 73-4-11 and a brief glance at other statutes 
governing general adjudications clarifies that notice of the Proposed Determination must be 
mailed to claimants in the general adjudication. Other Utah cases support this conclusion. 
6In general adjudications, objections are treated like pleadings. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-4-14. The State Engineer files an answer to the objection and the matter is tried before 
the district court. Id. at § 73-4-15. Therefore supplements should be treated as amendments 
to a complaint. 
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Although the State Engineer argues that the Canal Company waived its right to receive 
notification by mail, the district court made no such finding, and waiver does not apply to the 
circumstances of this case. 
A. A Plain Language Analysis of § 73-4-11 Supports the District Court's 
Decision, 
As the State Engineer correctly points out, the paramount concern of Utah's appellate 
courts when interpreting statutes "is to give effect to the legislative intent, manifested by the 
plain language of the statute." State v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 2002 UT 75, f 13, 52 
P.3d 1257 (citations omitted). This Court further clarified that "[ujnless a statute is 
ambiguous, we will not look beyond the plain language of the statute... [and will] 'presume 
that the legislature used each word advisedly."' Id. (quoting CT. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 
1999 UT 35, Tj 9, 977 P.2d 479 (further quotation and citation omitted)). When looking at 
the plain language of the statute, this Court "seek[s] to render all parts [of the statute] 
relevant and meaningful." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Conducting a plain 
language analysis of § 73-4-11 can lead to only one conclusion - affirmance of the district 
court's ruling. 
1. Nature and Purpose of General Adjudications. 
The Utah Legislature long ago recognized the need to establish a procedure for filing 
an action to determine "the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters o f any 
stream or water source in the state. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1(1) (1989 & Supp. 2003). The 
purposes of establishing a special statutory adjudicative procedure were "to prevent 
piecemeal litigation in the determination of water rights and determine them all in one 
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action" and "to make a permanent record of such rights by decree of court instead of 
permitting the evidence thereof to rest in parole." Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co. v. Burton, 70 
Utah 239, 259 P. 408, 410 (1927). The Utah Code specifies the procedures that govern 
general adjudications. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to 73-4-24 (1989 & Supp. 2003). 
Because general adjudications are statutory creatures not contemplated by our traditional 
judicial system, this Court has recognized that "the familiar rules of practice and procedure 
by which the courts are guided in ordinary lawsuits do not apply in such cases where the 
Legislature has laid down other and different rules relative to a particular subject." 
Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co., 259 P. at 411. To emphasize this point, § 73-4-3 states "[i]n all 
such cases the court shall proceed to determine the water rights involved in the manner 
provided by this chapter, and not otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3. 
2. The plain language of § 73-4-11 
In this case, the State Engineer has requested this Court to interpret § 73-4-11, 
claiming that the district court's interpretation was flawed. Section 73-4-11 outlines the 
procedure for the State Engineer to prepare and submit a "report to the court with his 
recommendation of how all rights involved [in a general adjudication] shall be determined." 
Id. at § 73-4-11. After the State Engineer has fully considered all Water User's Claims, 
surveys, records, and files, and after conducting a "personal examination of the river system 
or water source," the State Engineer must create "a proposed determination of all rights to 
the use of the water of such river system or water source" involved in the general 
adjudication. Id. A copy of the State Engineer's Proposed Detemiination must "be mailed 
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by regular mail to each claimant with notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may 
within ninety days from such date of mailing file with the clerk of the district court a written 
objection thereto duly verified on oath." Id. 
The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the Legislature intended all of 
the claimants to receive a copy of the general adjudication by mail. The wording of the 
statute is not ambiguous or confusing. Delivery by mail ensures that all claimants receive 
notice of the proposed determination at the same time. 'This Court has held that regular 
mailing when allowed by statute, as opposed to actual receipt, is sufficient notice." Jensen 
v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1992). Therefore, this Court should rule that the plain 
language of the § 73-4-11 requires notice by mailing. 
B. The Contrast Between §§ 73-4-3 and 73-4-11 
1. Section 73-4-3 contains two methods for providing notice 
Had the Legislature intended for service any other way, the statute would have so 
stated. In § 73-4-3, the State Engineer must give notice to all claimants in the general 
adjudication when a water survey has been completed. This section specifies that notice may 
be given to the claimants "by registered mail or by personal service to all claimants whose 
names appear on the list" of claimants maintained by the State Engineer. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-4-3. Claimants have "90 days after such service of such notice . . . [to] file a written 
statement with the clerk of the court setting forth his respective claim to the use of such 
water." Id. The statute further specifies that "[njotice given by mail shall be complete when 
the notice is mailed." Id. According to this statute, either personal service or mailing notice 
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by registered mail fulfilled the notice requirement. 
2. The Legislature intended the difference between the statutes 
The general adjudication statutes contain different ways of providing notice depending 
on the nature of the proceeding. The Legislature specifically provided two methods of 
serving notice of the water survey's completion on claimants in § 73-4-3. Service of notice 
under this statute is allowed either by mail or by personal service on the claimant. However, 
§ 73-4-11 provides only one method of service - by mail. As has already been mentioned, 
when interpreting statutes, this Court presumes that the Legislature used each word 
advisedly. See Huntington-Cleveland Irr. Co., 2002 UT 75 at f 13. If the Legislature had 
intended for the proposed determination to be served on claimants in a general adjudication 
any other way, it would have so stated as it did in § 73-4-3. Instead, the Legislature provided 
that the proposed determination could only be served on claimants in the general adjudication 
by regular mail. Indeed, the Legislature specified that the 90-day period for filing an 
objection begin to run "from such date of mailing" Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) 
(emphasis added). To interpret § 73-4-11 any other way, this Court would have to ignore the 
plain language of the statute. 
C. Other Utah Cases Addressing Notice Require Strict Compliance 
In other water rights cases, this Court has long recognized the need to strictly comply 
with statutory notice requirements. In Mosby Irrigation Company v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 
354 P.2d 848 (1960), a water user challenged the decision of the State Engineer to reinstate 
an application to appropriate water with a later priority date. Id at 850. The State Engineer 
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005 16 
mailed a letter to the irrigation company's designated representative by registered mail 
infomiing it that proof of appropriation was due on a certain date. See id. Because the 
irrigation company's designated representative was dead, it never received this letter. After 
the due date had passed, the State Engineer sent another letter to the irrigation company 
informing it of the lapse of the water right and identifying a procedure for reinstating the 
right. The irrigation company responded to this second letter, but because of the lapse, its 
application to appropriate was reinstated with a reduced priority date. Id. 
On appeal, the irrigation company argued that § 73-3-16, the relevant statute 
concerning notice in that case, required "actual receipt of the notice." Mosby, 354 P.2d at 
851. However, this Court held that "[t]he legislature has the right to make reasonable 
regulations as to public or legal notices, and the statutory requirements must be completely 
met in order to effect a valid notice." Id. Because the State Engineer had sent notice as 
contemplated by the statute, i.e. by registered mail, its actions complied with the statutory 
requirement. 
In Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp, 2000 UT 69, 9 P.3d 762, a water user 
challenged a lower court's determination that he had failed to file protest in an administrative 
proceeding in a timely manner. The water user alleged that a notice by publication was 
deficient and caused his untimely protest. According to the relevant statute, notification of 
an extension to put water to a beneficial use had to include information about "the diligence 
claimed and the reason for the request." Id. at f 16, (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-
12(2)(f)(ii)). The notification published did not contain the required information. After 
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reviewing cases considering public policy and strict compliance with statutory notification 
requirements, this Court overruled both the trial court and the court of appeals, holding that 
there "is no reason to treat the statutory notice requirement any less strictly in the water rights 
context than we treat it in the putative father and governmental immunity contexts." Id. at 
U 22. This Court noted that, just as in the governmental immunity cases, "'[a]ctual notice 
does not cure a party's failure to meet"' statutory notice requirements. Id. at f 21 (quoting 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, If 19, 977 P.2d 1201). 
According to this Court's decisions in cases interpreting other statutes of the Water 
Code, strict compliance with notice requirements is required. In both Mosby Irrigation 
Company and Longley, this Court required notification to be given strictly according to the 
method contained in the applicable statutes. A plain language analysis of § 73-4-11 shows 
that the State Engineer's proposed determination must be mailed by regular mail to the 
affected claimants. It is an uncontested fact that the State Engineer did not mail the 
proposed determination to the Canal Company. Therefore, the Canal Company did not 
receive proper notice and the ninety-day period did not begin to run from the date of the 
signed "Notice Receipt and Waiver" but rather from the date the last such notice was mailed. 
D, The Purported Waiver by the Canal Company Does not Affect the 
Outcome of this Case 
The State Engineer asserts that the Canal Company expressly waived its right to 
receive notice by mail. According to his brief, "the State Engineer has allowed water users 
who choose to do so to receive proposed determinations in person." Appellant Brief, 15. 
However, the district court never found that the Canal Company expressly waived notice. 
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Additionally, cases that the State Engineer cites in support of his waiver argument are 
irrelevant to this discussion. Because of the circumstances of this case, the purported waiver 
should not be enforced. 
1. The district court made no finding of waiver 
According to the State Engineer, a Delbert Tidwell signed a document entitled Notice 
Receipt and Waiver on behalf of the Canal Company on December 15, 1972. (R. 37.) This 
document states that "the undersigned waives any further service in connection therewith and 
consents to the entry of a final decree in this cause unless a formal protest is made by the 
undersigned claimant to the above-entitled court within ninety (90) days from and after date 
hereof."7 (R. 39.) The State Engineer argues that this purported waiver removed his 
obligation to strictly comply with § 73-4-11. The district court, however, did not determine 
that the Canal Company had waived its right to notice. 
Waiver is defined as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Soter's, Inc. 
v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) (quotation and 
citations omitted). This Court has established a three-pronged test to establish waiver, the 
elements of which are "(1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its 
existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." Id. at 940 (citations omitted). 
Explaining the third element, this Court noted that "the intent to relinquish a right must be 
distinct," and in making such a determination, "a fact finder need only determine whether the 
7It must be noted that this language in the alleged waiver form mischaracterizes the 
"written objection" provided for in § 73-4-11 as a "formal protest." 
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totality of the circumstances 'warrants the inference of relinquishment.5" Id. at 942. 
In its memorandum decision, the district court noted as an undisputed fact that the 
State Engineer "claims that the Notice, Receipt, and Waiver signed by [Delbert] Tidwell (an 
alleged agent of this company) vitiates [the failure to mail notice of the Proposed 
Determination] and begins the running of the 90 day objection period from the alleged date 
of the Notice, to wit, December 15,1972." (R. 440 (emphasis added).) Although the district 
court recognized that the State Engineer's had made such a claim, it did not find that the 
claim was valid or that if valid the document actually constituted waiver. Because it 
fashioned an equitable remedy that made the question of the validity of waiver irrelevant, the 
district court did not make any findings regarding waiver. Should this Court determine, 
however, that the waiver is an issue, it must remand this case to the district court for such 
findings to be made. See Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, f 24, 63 P.3d 1184. 
2. Waiver cannot be established by the facts of this case 
Even if waiver need be considered by the district court, facts do not exist to establish 
the elements of waiver. Even though waiver may be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence, Setter's, Inc., 857 P,2d at 942 n.6., the State Engineer cannot meet that standard. 
The only evidence supporting the contention that the Canal Company waived its right 
to receive notice of the Proposed Determination by mail is the "Notice Receipt and Waiver" 
purportedly signed by the secretary of the Canal Company, Delbert Tidwell, on December 
15, 1972. (R. 37.) This document, however, is not self-authenticating and its validity was 
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challenged in the proceedings before the district court.8 
The third element of waiver requires a finding of intentional relinquishment. Soter 's 
Inc., 857 P.2d at 940. The Canal Company, like all claimants in the general adjudication, 
was to receive notice of the proposed determination by mail according to the plain language 
of 73-4-11. However, the Notice Receipt and Waiver makes no mention of this notification 
right. In fact, the document makes no mention of the statute at all. By signing the document, 
a party is only informed that it "waives any further service in connection therewith." (R.39.) 
There is no evidence in the record that Delbert Tidwell, who is now dead (R. 142), knew of 
the right to receive the Proposed Determination by mail, or that he knew he was waiving the 
right to such service and the right to respond within ninety-days of such service. In a case 
examining the intentional relinquishment of a right to file suit and submit to mandatory 
arbitration, this Court has held that "[w]ithout knowledge that the provision was mandatory, 
[a party] could not have intentionally relinquished any right." McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Utah,2Q0l UT31,f 19,20 P.3d901. Without evidence that Delbert Tidwell knew 
of the right he was waiving, there can be no determination that an intentional relinquishment 
of the right was made. 
As is evidenced by the hundreds of pages of Notice Receipt and Waivers contained 
in the record (R. 13, 14, 15), the State Engineer has a policy of avoiding strict compliance 
8The challenges in the district court included the following: that Mr. Tidwell's 
signature could not be authenticated, that the document apparently contained the handwriting 
of two different individuals, that no copy could be found in the Canal Company's records, 
and that there is no evidence that Mr. Tidwell was ever given a copy. (R. 65-66.) 
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with the statutory notice requirements by securing "waivers" from claimants to general 
adjudications. Instead of complying with the statute, the State Engineer has created a process 
that unnecessarily and unfairly lengthens and delays the general adjudication process. Book 
5 of the proposed determination, which contained the recommendation concerning the Canal 
Company's Water User's Claim, was ready on May 1, 1972. (R. l:iii.) In the record there 
are waivers signed by claimants picking up Book 5 of the proposed determination dated from 
November 1972 (R.13: tab A (John Arselmo)) until November 1973 (R.14: tab F (Nephi 
Foster).)9 It is unclear how ttie claimants were informed of the need to come to the State 
Engineer's Office to pick up Iheir copies of the Proposed Determination or what they were 
told would happen if they failed to do so.10 However, it is clear that the State Engineer had 
no intention of strictly complying with the statute by mailing the Proposed Determination to 
the claimants as required by statute. 
The State Engineer did not even submit a certificate of filing with the district court 
until February 29,2000. (R. 16-17.) This certificate references all of the Notice Receipt and 
Waivers and includes several affidavits of service by mailing. (R. 17.) The affidavits of 
service indicate that Book 5 was mailed to eighteen claimants on October 23, 1973 (R. 18-
9There is a Notice Receipt and Waiver signed by Joseph Novak dated June 4, 1974, 
but it is unclear whether Mr. Novak, an attorney, obtained the proposed determination on 
behalf of a client. (R. 14: tab N) He is not listed as a claimant in the index to Book 5. 
10The Canal Company established by affidavit that the practice and policy of the State 
Engineer until 2000 was to consider all objections on their merits regardless of whether or 
not they were filed within the ninety-day period in order to make the Final Decree as accurate 
as possible. See Affidavit of Harold D. Donaldson,^ 6 (attached&s Addendum!). (R. 149.) 
This affidavit was never challenged by the State Engineer. 
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22) and to six claimants on November 14, 1973 (R. 23-24.) There is no evidence in the 
record to explain this lapse of over a year between the first signed Notice Receipt and Waiver 
and compliance with the statutory requirements of § 73-4-11 by mailing a copy of the 
proposed determination to claimants. However, by failing to comply with the statute, the 
State Engineer unnecessarily lengthened the time for conducting the general adjudication and 
placed certain claimants at an unfair advantage by giving them more time to examine the 
proposed determination and the opportunity to review earlier-filed objections. The State 
Engineer should not be allowed to rely on the alleged waiver that it obtained through a policy 
of ignoring statutory requirements, thereby giving some people over a year to act on the 
information, especially when the circumstances of the "waiver" cannot be determined. 
3. The shareholder cases relied upon by the State Engineer are 
inapplicable 
In support of his argument that the Canal Company could waive its rights to notice, 
the State Engineer cites two cases discussing whether shareholders received proper notice 
of a shareholders' meeting. See Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irr. Co., 54 Utah 120, 179 P. 984, 
987 (1919); Badger v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 23-24 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In both cases, the 
shareholders alleged that the notification they received did not strictly comply with statutory 
requirements. See id. In both cases, the courts held that "'if the persons entitled to notice 
of corporate meeting actually attend it and participate in the business there transacted, it is 
immaterial whether the notice was given in the manner prescribed by statute.'" Badger, 896 
P.2d at 24 (quoting Beggs, 179 P. at 987). In these cases, the parties received no harm 
because they actually participated in the proceedings. However, in the present case, the State 
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Engineer is attempting to prohibit the Canal Company from participating in the general 
adjudication, eliminating its ability to challenge the Proposed Determination. In fact, in 
Badger, the Court recognized that when "failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a 
substantive right of one of the parties and possibly prejudice that party, then courts require 
strict compliance" with statutory notification requirements. Badger, 896 P.2d at 23 (quoting 
Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1333 (Utah App. 1990). 
By attempting to dismiss the objection, the State Engineer is affecting the Canal Company's 
substantive right to have its objection heard on the merits. 
Instead of supporting the State Engineer's position, these cases actually support both 
the Canal Company's position and the district court's ruling that the State Engineer should 
have (but failed to) strictly comply with the statute. Because of the prejudicial loss of Canal 
Company's substantive right to challenge the Proposed Determination and to prove that the 
Proposed Determination should be modified, strict compliance with the notification 
requirements of § 73-4-11 should be required of the State Engineer. 
4. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 
The State Engineer also argues that a United States Supreme Court case allows 
personal service to substitute for strict compliance with statutory notice requirements. In 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 
(1950), the United States Supreme Court considered whether publication of notice in a 
newspaper was constitutionally adequate under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 307. The 
Court noted that due process is satisfied when notice "is reasonably calculated, under all the 
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circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. The State Engineer cites this case to 
support his contention that "[pjersonal service of written notice . . . [is] always adequate in 
any type of proceeding." Id. at 313, Appellant Brief, 16. In Mullane, however, the Supreme 
Court determined that notification by mail was appropriate. See id. at 319. As in the present 
case, Mullane involved "a large number of. . . interests." Id. However, the case does not 
create a hierarchy of notice or a carte blanche right to ignore statutory notice requirements, 
nor does it establish, as the State Engineer asserts, that personal service provides "a higher 
form of service than service by mail." Appellant Brief 16. Rather, Mullane states simply 
that due process is met by any service reasonably calculated to provide interested parties with 
the opportunity to address and object to claims. 
The cases cited by the State Engineer do not support his conclusion that the Canal 
Company actually waived its right to notice by mailing, and the district court made no finding 
on the existence or absence of waiver. Therefore, the State Engineer's waiver arguments are 
unavailing. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DEVELOPED AN APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE 
REMEDY 
The State Engineer argues that the district court erred in considering the Canal 
Company's equitable arguments. Appellant Brief 27. According precedent laid down by 
this Court, the district court's consideration of the Canal Company's equitable arguments, 
to the extent that it did consider them, was entirely appropriate. "It is well established that 
equitable defenses may be applied in actions at law and that principles of equity apply 
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wherever necessaiy to prevent injustice." Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 
1987). When fashioning an equitable remedy, "a trial court is accorded considerable latitude 
and discretion." United States Fuel Co, v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 2003 UT 49, f 9, 
79 P.3d 945. Because the district court fashioned an appropriate equitable remedy, its 
decision should be affirmed. 
A. After Properly Interpreting the Statute, an Equitable Remedy was 
Needed 
Once the district court determined that § 73-4-11 required notice of the Proposed 
Determination be sent to claimants in general adjudications by mail, it faced the problem that 
the Canal Company never received notification by mail. The district court specified as an 
undisputed fact that u[t]he State Engineer did not mail by regular mail to the [Canal 
Company] a Notice of Proposed Determination." (R. 440.) Because mailing did not occur, 
the running of the ninety-day period could not begin to run "from the time of such mailing." 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11. Therefore, the district court needed to fashion an equitable 
remedy to resolve the issue of timing. Because of the State Engineer's failure to "strictly 
comply with the statutory language . . . and its delay in raising the defense" of timeliness, the 
district court determined "to treat the [Canal Company's] objection as being timely filed." 
(R. 443.) This decision is supported not only be the State Engineer's actions (or more 
specifically inactions) but also by the evidentiary problems that now exist because twenty-
seven years expired before any action was taken by the State Engineer. 
1. The evidence has evaporated during the State Engineer's twenty-
seven year delay 
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This case suffers from problems that must be anticipated when proceedings have 
lingered for nearly fifty years. The State Engineer's motion to dismiss is based on a "Notice 
Receipt and Waiver" form purportedly signed by Delbert Tidwell, the secretary of the Canal 
Company, on December 15, 1972. However, Delbert Tidwell is dead. (R. 142.) No 
testimony can be obtained from him regarding the circumstances existing at the time he 
received the Proposed Determination, including what he may have been told by employees 
of the State Engineer in light of the undisputed policy of that office not to challenge 
objections on timeliness grounds. (R.149.) We do not know if a copy of the Notice Receipt 
and Waiver was retained by Mr. Tidwell or was even provided by the State Engineer. The 
Canal Company's records do not contain the Notice Receipt and Waiver or the Proposed 
Determination books supposedly given to Mr. Tidwell. (R. 66,141-42.) The Canal Company 
is not alone in the loss of key evidence and witnesses; the State Engineer has also lost several 
key personnel involved in the prosecution of this general adjudication. None of these 
problems would have arisen had the State Engineer not waited nearly three decades to act. 
Finally, the court record of the general adjudication is inadequate. The district court 
docket contains very few records prior to 2000. (R. 153.) Because there is not a docket of 
what was filed before 2000, the district court file may be incomplete. The file for this case 
has been stored in boxes at the Seventh District Court, which clerks were on at least one 
occasion unable to locate. (R. 153) Because of the incomplete docket and inadequate filing, 
it is impossible to determine whether the court file actually contains all the documents that 
have been submitted over the years. (Id.) While admittedly speculative, it is entirely possible 
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that the Canal Company submitted a timely objection that has since been lost. Over the 
decades,11 much of the evidence has been lost, and determining the circumstances 
surrounding the receipt of the Proposed Determination has become nearly (if not entirely) 
impossible. This long delay supports the equitable remedy fashioned by the district court. 
2. The State Engineer has routinely allowed other late objections 
In addition to the long passage of time, the State Engineer's own actions in this very 
same general adjudication support the equitable remedy fashioned by the district court. 
While the State Engineer moved to dismiss the Canal Company's objection because it was 
untimely, he has embraced other late objections and treated other claimants more favorably. 
In fact, this was undisputedly his practice until 2000. (R. 149.) The State Engineer argues 
that there is no relationship between his actions towards these other claimants and his actions 
towards the Canal Company. Though the State Engineer argues that this Court should strictly 
apply the ninety-day period to the Canal Company's objection, the examples that follow 
demonstrate that his practice has not been to seek strict application the statute. By treating 
claimants differently, the State Engineer has prejudiced the Canal Company in his effort to 
keep the Canal Company's claim from being decided on the merits. 
On November 14, 1973, the State Engineer mailed a copy of the Proposed 
11Richard Nixon was still in the White House, The Godfather was a brand new film, 
and the United States was still fighting in Vietnam when the Canal Company filed its initial 
objection. An entire generation has slowly passed away while the State Engineer has silently 
ignored the Canal Company's objection, only to suddenly act nearly three decades later, after 
living memory has vanished into the grave and recorded evidence has been lost to the 
relentless passage of time. 
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Determination to Sam Sampinos (the predecessor to Eureka Energy). (R. 238.) Eureka 
Energy filed an objection with the district court on January 23,1981, over seven years later. 
(R. 239-40.) Although on April 25,2000, the State Engineer moved to dismiss the claim for 
several reasons, including the untimeliness of the objection, he nevertheless requested the 
district court hear the merits of the objection. (R. 243.) 
On November 29,1972, J. Clarence and Kate W. Ingram signed a Notice Receipt and 
Wavier. (R. 246.) They filed an objection to the Proposed Determination on April 12,1973, 
135 days late. (R. 247.) Although the State Engineer challenged the objection on April 25, 
2000, he did not move to dismiss for untimeliness and requested that the Proposed 
Determination be amended. (R. 250-51.) 
On November 13, 1972, the attorney for Kaiser Steel Corp. signed a Notice Receipt 
and Waiver indicating receipt of the Proposed Determination. (R. 254.) The district court 
received Kaiser Steel Corp.'s objection to the Proposed Determination on August 2, 1973 -
over eight months late. (R. 255.) On April 25, 2000, the State Engineer answered Kaiser 
Steel Corp.'s objection. (R. 265.) He did not move to dismiss the objection for Kaiser Steel 
Corp.'s failure to file the objection in a timely manner but requested that the Proposed 
Determination be amended in conformity with the objection. (R. 265.) 
On January 30,1973, James W. Fausett signed a Notice Receipt and Waiver indicating 
receipt of a copy of the Proposed Determination. (R. 268.) Mr. Fausett submitted an 
objection notarized on October 29,1973, but it was not filed with the district court until June 
18, 1976, almost three years later. (R. 269.) The State Engineer answered this objection on 
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April 25, 2000, and requested either that the objection be dismissed as untimely or that the 
Proposed Determination be modified. (R. 271-72.) 
On November 3, 1972, Calvin K. Jacob and Milton E. Jacob each signed, a Notice 
Receipt and Waiver indicating receipt of the Proposed Determination. (R. 275.) On August 
21, 1973, their joint objection was notarized (it does not indicate when it was filed with the 
district court). (R. 276.) The State Engineer answered the Jacobs' objection on April 25, 
2000, arguing that it should be dismissed as untimely, but nevertheless requesting that the 
substance of the objection be added in an addendum to the Proposed Determination. (R. 
279.) 
In light of the State Engineer's acceptance of the content of these objections even 
though he nominally asserted that the objections were untimely, the State Engineer is in no 
position to question the equitable remedy fashioned by the district court. Given the State 
Engineer's actions on other objections filed after the expiration of the ninety-day period, the 
district court's decision to treat the Canal Company's objection as timely was and is 
completely appropriate. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
When a district court invokes its equitable powers to fashion a remedy in a given 
situation, it "is accorded considerable latitude." United States Fuel Co., 2003 UT 49, at f 9 
(citations omitted) Because of the State Engineer's delay and failure to strictly comply with 
the statute, the district court fashioned a remedy that would allow the Canal Company's 
objections to be heard on the merits. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
4848-3515-2128/GR255 005 3 0 
fashioned this remedy. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the district court. 
Ill- EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED § 73-4-11 
THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD ON OTHER GROUNDS 
Even if, arguendo, this Court determines that the district court erroneously interpreted 
§ 73 -4-11 or improperly crafted an equitable remedy and that the Canal Company's obj ection 
was indeed filed late, the district court's Memorandum Decision should still be upheld. This 
court has noted that it "may affirm a trial court's decision on any proper ground(s), despite 
the trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 
2003 UT 41, | 23 n.8, 82 P.3d 1064 (quoting Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337,342 n.3 (Utah 1997) (quoting Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988))). Because of § 73-4-10 and/or the equitable doctrines of 
laches or waiver, this Court may if necessary affirm the district court's ruling on other 
grounds. 
A. Section 73-4-10 Allows for the Extension of Time 
According to § 73-4-10, the district court has "power . . . to extend, upon due cause 
shown, the time for filing any other pleading, statement, report or protest." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-4-10 (1989). The plain language of this statute grants the district court the authority to 
consider an objection to the Proposed Determination filed beyond the ninety day statutory 
period. The State Engineer argues that case law prohibits late objections in general 
adjudications and that § 73-4-10 allows only prospective, not retroactive extensions. 
1. The Canal Company established due cause 
According to § 73-4-10, a court may "extend, upon due cause shown, the time for 
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filing any. ..protest." Utah Code Ann. 73-4-10 (1989). The Canal Company has shown due 
cause why the ninety-day period should be extended to allow its original objection to be 
considered timely filed. As the Canal Company's objection will be determined on its merits, 
there is no prejudice to other parties,12 and where prejudice to the Canal Company is great, 
due cause exists to excuse the untimely filing. 
While Utah appellate courts have not addressed the "due cause" standard, other courts 
have. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has explained that the "due cause" test "is one of 
objective reasonableness." Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 918 P.2d 350, 363 (N.M. 1996). 
Pennsylvania courts have equated due cause to reasonable cause and have noted that trial 
courts "have the discretion to determine from the record whether due cause exists." In re 
Petition to Increase Mileage Limit Levied on Real Estate from 25 Mills to 30 Mills, 646 A.2d 
61, 65 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); In re Petition of City ofClairton, 694 A.2d 372, 374 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1997). The State Engineer argues that the Canal Company "offered no 
evidence or explanation of any circumstance to justify or excuse its late filing of the 1973 
Objection or any of the other objections." Appellant Brief 28. Contrary to the State 
Engineer's assertion, the Canal Company provided ample evidence to show due cause. 
The State Engineer insists that the Canal Company has "the burden of demonstrating 
that it had due cause for filing the objections late." Appellant Brief 28. The Canal Company 
12While Lee Thayn and Green River City (the other water users who could claim to 
be prejudiced by the extension because they hold or held the right to divert water from the 
same point of diversion on the Green River) appeared in the proceeding before the district 
court, neither filed any objection to the extension either before the district court or here. 
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has established due cause to extend the time for filing because the State Engineer 
inexplicably delayed bringing his motion to dismiss for twenty-seven years, resulting in the 
loss of evidence and prejudicing the Canal Company by allowing it to believe and act on the 
assumption that its objections would be heard.13 
The State Engineer's position is that the Canal Company must show that due cause 
existed in 1973 to extend the time for filing. This argument misses the point. Section 73-4-
10 does not limit the showing of due cause to any particular time period. The untimeliness 
of the Canal Company's objection was not challenged until 2000. At that time, the Canal 
Company explained why due cause now exists to justify the extension of time and permit the 
adjudication of its objection on the merits. Due cause must exist at the time the petition for 
extension is made, and that petition was made on December 1, 2000. Because the Canal 
Company has shown that the intervening twenty-seven years caused witnesses and 
documents to disappear, the State Engineer's too-long delayed action establishes due cause 
to extend the time for filing the objection in 1973. The district court extended the time-
period for filing the objection by determining that the ninety days began to run following the 
last certificate of mailing or waiver signed by claimants receiving Book 5 of the Proposed 
Determination. (R. 442-44.) The grant of an extension is reviewed by this Court for abuse-
of-discretion. See, e.g., Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, 13 P.3d 616 
(reviewing extension of time for appeal under URAP Rule 4(e)); Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 
13Indeed, this was undisputedly the policy of the State Engineer until October of 2000. 
(R. 149.) 
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249, 254 (Utah 1998) (reviewing grant of extension for habeas corpus petition). 
2. Section 73-4-10 allows retroactive extensions of time 
The State Engineer argues that granting retroactive extensions of time to claimants 
under § 73-4-10 to file late objections causes § 73-4-11 to become superfluous and 
inoperative. Appellant Brief, 24. A brief glance at other statutes regarding general 
adjudications indicates the contrary. Additionally, despite the State Engineer's argument that 
§ 73-4-11 should be treated as jurisdictional, Utah case law holds otherwise. 
a. The general adjudication statutes are inclusive 
When a general adjudication is initiated, the State Engineer must give notice to water 
users along the river system or water source who may be potential claimants that the general 
adjudication is now pending in district court. The State Engineer must "publishf] notice once 
a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper designated by the court as most likely to 
give notice to such claimants." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3 (1989). This notice must inform 
potential claimants that they must "notify the state engineer within 90 days from the date 
notice is given of their names and addresses." Id. After the expiration of ninety days, the 
State Engineer must prepare a list of all claimants, certify that the list is complete, and submit 
the list to the district court. See id. However, the statute permits the list to be amended 
beyond the ninety-day period to include tardy or additional claimants. "The court upon 
petition may by order permit the addition of names and addresses to this list at any time 
during the pendency of the action." Id. Using the State Engineer's logic, this ninety-day 
period in § 73-4-3 for responding to notice once the general adjudication is initiated would 
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be considered superfluous and inoperative. However, the Legislature purposefully created 
a method for updating the general adjudication in this section. 
This language demonstrates that the general adjudication statute was designed to be 
inclusive, not exclusive. When adjudicating the rights of all water users along an entire river 
system or water source, the State Engineer and the Court must ensure that all claimants 
receive an opportunity to be heard. Of course, it would be impossible to leave a general 
adjudication open and unending; however, the Legislature recognized the need to add 
additional claimants even after the ninety-day period has expired for interested claimants to 
register. Thus, it would seem that the time limits imposed in the general adjudication were 
established more in the interest of expediting a huge undertaking than to create technical 
deadlines excluding claimants from having their objections heard on the merits. 
As the State Engineer points out numerous times, "general water right adjudications 
take a long time." Appellant Brief, 6. This particular general adjudication has taken an 
extremely long time. Since its initiation in 1956 (R. l:i), nearly fifty years have passed and 
yet no final decree has issued. The State Engineer completed his proposed determination in 
this general adjudication in 1972, yet the general adjudication is still open.14 Over this long 
period of time, the number of water users along the Green River has likely increased, the uses 
14It would seem that in 1972 the bulk of the work (i.e., reviewing water user's claims, 
inspecting the drainage area, mapping hydrographic surveys, and fashioning the Proposed 
Determination) was complete. The only task left being to resolve objections to the Proposed 
Determination in order to obtain a final decree. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-15, -17 (1989). 
However, the State Engineer took no action regarding the Canal Company's objection until 
2000. 
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of water have necessarily changed, the course of creeks and streams could have changed, the 
needs of the water users have changed, and even the climate and weather patterns may have 
changed. A general adjudication cannot be expected to occur by taking a snapshot of the 
water users in 1972 and expect twenty-seven years later (when the motion to dismiss was 
filed) or thirty-one years later (when this brief was filed) that everything has remained the 
same. A general adjudication was never intended to be limited to the information available 
only at a certain moment in time. A general adjudication is not static like regular civil 
proceedings. It is dynamic—like the nature of water itself. 
In fact, the State Engineer recognized the need to make changes to the general 
adjudication and to his Proposed Determination. In oral arguments before the district court, 
the State Engineer admitted "we feel like it's imperative that the State Engineer has to have 
the ability, if there's mistakes in the proposed determination, to correct those mistakes." (R. 
454:30:10-12.) The State Engineer also stated "[w]e recognize at times that some - some of 
the things that we put in the proposed determination are mistakes and - and we feel - or we 
believe that in fairness we should have - we should be able to correct that in fairness to the 
water users."15 (R. 454:31:20-24.) The State Engineer recognizes that it is important to be 
fair to all water users in conducting general adjudications.16 
15From this statement, it appears that the State Engineer believes that he (rather than 
the courts) has the authority to determine the merits of objections to the Proposed 
Determination. 
16Despite these admissions concerning his practice of accepting and acting upon late 
objections and despite acting favorably upon the portion of the Canal Company's objection 
seeking an increase in irrigation duty from four to six acre feet, the State Engineer seeks to 
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The Legislature recognized the need to allow the general adjudication to be dynamic 
and allow for changes during its long pendency. It allows for new claimants to be added to 
the general adjudication. It allows for the court to permit amendments and to extend 
deadlines for filings. The State Engineer has admitted that when mistakes occur in a 
proposed determination, they need to be corrected, whether or not the objection giving notice 
of the mistake is received late. As the Legislature intended, the courts have the discretion 
to allow for changes while the general adjudication is proceeding. In this case, the district 
court properly exercised its discretion to allow the Canal Company's initial objection to be 
considered timely. 
b. Other statutes do not limit retroactive application 
The State Engineer argues that § 73-4-10 cannot be retroactively applied. According 
to the State Engineer, § 73-4-11 is jurisdictional "like section 63-30-12 [of the Governmental 
Immunity Act] and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Appellant Brief, 26. 
However, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, the time restrictions in certain 
statutes are not jurisdictional prerequisites "but a requirement that, like a statute of 
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World 
Airlines Inc., 455 U.S. 385,393, 102 S.Ct. 1127,71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), and therefore can 
be modified retroactively. According to this analysis, § 73-4-11 is not jurisdictional. 
The first problem with the comparison of § 73-4-11 to § 63-30-12 and Rule 4 is that 
the district court already had jurisdiction over the Canal Company and its Water User's 
strictly apply the ninety-day period in this one instance. 
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Claim. The Canal Company became a participant in the general adjudication when it 
indicated that it held a water right along the Green River and filed its Water User's Claim. 
Compliance or non-compliance with § 73-4-11 is irrelevant to the jurisdiction of the district 
court. Once a general adjudication is initiated, the district court has jurisdiction over all 
claimants who have filed water user claims pursuant to § 73-4-3. As has already been 
explained, claimants can constantly be added to the general adjudication under § 73-4-3 upon 
petition to the district court. Therefore, there can be no question that the district court had 
jurisdiction over the Canal Company and its claim 
Additionally, § 63-30-12 and rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure both 
require notice of an intent to file an action before the action can actually be taken. Section 
63-30-12 states "[a] claim against the state . . . is barred unless notice of claim is filed . . . 
within one year after the claim arises." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (2003 Supp.) (emphasis 
added). Rule 4 states "notice of appeal. . . shall be filed with the clerk of the court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." However, these 
requirements have been held to be "precondition^] to the bringing o f an action. Madson 
v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that such 
requirements "creating a 'condition precedent' to commencing an action create a 
precondition to suit and that a party's failure to satisfy a precondition results in an 
adjudication for 'lack of jurisdiction.'" McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21, \ 12. 
Unlike these notices, objections to the Proposed Determination are not preconditions to suit. 
As the United States Supreme Court has ruled, such statutory requirements "are 
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subject to waiver" and other equitable claims. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393. This Court has also 
recently held that rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is not an absolute bar to 
obtaining jurisdiction for appellate review. Noting that rule 4(e) contains a "good cause" 
exception to the timely filing requirement, this Court stated "the recognition that there will 
arise circumstances when an inflexible application of the rule 4(a) deadlines would result in 
unconscionable injustices." State ex rel. M.M., A.M., and S.S. (T.S. v. State), 2003 UT 54, 
Tf 10, 82 P.3d 1104. Even though rule 4 has a mandatory time period for filing notices of 
appeal, it need not be applied inflexibly in all cases. 
Thus, § 73-4-11 is not jurisdictional and the ninety-day time period is subject to 
extension, waiver, and laches. It need not be inflexibly applied. In addition, the statutes 
cited by the State Engineer in favor of an absolute bar do not necessarily require the 
suggested unbending, strict enforcement. 
3. Utah case law does not support the State Engineer's position 
According to the State Engineer, this Court's recent determination in United States 
Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49,79 P.3d 945, and the holdings 
in related cases preclude courts from excusing late objections in general adjudications. The 
State Engineer misreads these cases and incorrectly concludes that these cases support his 
position, when in reality, they indicate that late objections may be excused. 
In United States Fuel Co., this Court considered whether a district court had properly 
decided "an action to quiet title to a prior right to use water from Cedar Creek." Id. at 1 1 . 
Although the State-Engineer's proposed determination gave Huntington-Cleveland Canal 
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Company (Huntington-Cleveland) a senior irrigation right, United States Fuel Company 
(USF) brought a private claim outside of the general adjudication to assert its priority right 
to the water claimed in the general adjudication by Huntington-Cleveland. Id. at f 5. USF 
had also filed an objection to the proposed determination in the general adjudication, but its 
objection was filed one day late. Id. at f 4. 
On appeal, this Court held that the State Engineer's proposed determination "cannot 
coexist with the prosecution of an independent action which could result in a judgment 
inconsistent with an uncontested portion of a proposed determination." Id. at \ 12. This 
Court noted that the Water Code mandates that "courts must render judgment in accordance 
with a proposed determination where the proposed determination is uncontested at the close 
of the ninety-day statutory period." Id. at f 15 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12). Because 
USF's objection was filed late in the general adjudication, Huntington-Cleveland "was 
entitled to judgment perfecting the state engineer's" proposed determination. Id. at % 17. 
Although this Court held that Huntington-Cleveland was entitled to seek judgment in the 
general adjudication, it did not foreclose USF from obtaining leave to file a late objection. 
This Court qualified the right of Huntington-Cleveland to obtain judgment based on 
the uncontested portion of the State Engineer's proposed determination. First, this Court 
stated that Huntington-Cleveland was entitled to judgment "[ujnless and until USF sought 
and obtained leave of court in the general adjudication to excuse its tardy objection." Id. at 
T[ 17. This Court also noted "that USF should be compelled to seek relief for its untimely-
filed objection to [Huntington-Cleveland's] claim" in the general adjudication. Id. at ^ 21. 
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Thus, the holding in United States Fuel Co. recognized that USF could have sought to have 
its late objection excused had it applied for such relief in the general adjudication. Although 
it found that USF had failed to file an objection within the ninety-day statutory period, this 
Court did not preclude USF from seeking relief in the general adjudication. 
The State Engineer also relies on the holdings in Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 
290-91 (Utah 1992) md Hicken v. North Ditch Irrigation Co., No. 960360-CA, at 2 (Utah 
Ct. App., March 20, 1997). In both of those cases, a lower court's decision to dismiss a 
claimant's objection to the State Engineer's proposed determination was upheld because the 
claimant had filed the objection late. Id. However, neither of these cases analyzed the 
impact of § 73-4-10 on the matter, nor does it appear that the claimants sought to have their 
late objection excused pursuant to that section. 
In the present case, the Canal Company responded to the State Engineer's motion to 
dismiss by moving the district court to excuse its late objection. (R. 59.) For over twenty-
seven years, the Canal Company had no indication that it had filed its objection late. As soon 
as the State Engineer made the Canal Company aware of the timeliness issue, the Canal 
Company moved for an extension of time. However, because the district court ruled that the 
Canal Company's filing was timely, the request to excuse the tardy filing was never 
addressed. Should this Court determine that the Canal Company's objection was untimely 
filed, it should nevertheless affirm the decision to the district court because § 73-4-10 grants 
authority to excuse late filings. 
B. The District Court's Decision May be Affirmed under the Alternative 
Equitable Doctrine of Laches 
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Even if this Court was to determine that § 73-4-10 does not give the district court 
discretion to extend the time for filing objections, the equitable doctrine of laches should 
prohibit the State Engineer pursuing a motion to dismiss filed twenty-seven years late. 
Outside of the general adjudication, "a defendant's usual recourse for a plaintiffs failure to 
proceed with the litigation consists of filing a motion to dismiss for the failure to prosecute" 
under rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however, as the State Engineer suggests, 
such recourse is unavailable here. (R. 167.) Therefore, the equitable doctrine of laches is 
an appropriate remedy given the State Engineer's unjustified twenty-seven year delay. 
Laches is an equitable doctrine, and equity demands that it be applied in this case to 
avoid injustice and prejudice to the Canal Company. As the court of appeals has noted, 
"[l]aches is an equitable doctrine 'based on the maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those 
who slumber on their rights.'" Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Int'l, 905 P.2d 312, 
314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Almeida v. Almeida, 669 P.2d 174, 180 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1983) (other quotation and citation omitted)). Other courts have noted that "[l]aches is an 
equitable doctrine which may be invoked when delay by one party works to the disadvantage 
of the other, causing a change of circumstances which would make the grant of relief to the 
delaying party inequitable." Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Public Works Bd., 836 
P.2d633, 636-37 (Nev. 1992). The State Engineer's twenty-seven year delay has caused the 
Canal Company to rely on the fact that its objection would be heard on the merits. 
According to Utah case law, "[t]o successfully assert laches one must establish that 
(1) plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action, and (2) defendants were prejudiced 
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by that delay." Nielson-Newey, 905 P.2dat 314 (citing Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 
P.2d 716, 726 (Utah App. 1990). Clearly, the first element of laches is met. The State 
Engineer brought this motion to dismiss twenty-seven years after the Canal Company's 
objection was filed. No excuse, whether it is lack of funding or the State Engineer's bald 
assertion that "general water rights adjudications take a long time," justifies this long delay. 
The prejudice element is also met in this case. In Nilson-Newey, the court of appeals 
upheld the trial court's dismissal of an action based on the doctrine of laches because the 
plaintiff failed to bring an action for an accounting and distribution of profits for over 35 
years. Id. at 316. The court noted the defendants' disadvantage because umany of the 
documents that might clarify these transactions are no longer available . . . that all but one 
of the original syndicate members is dead, and that witnesses who might clarify existing 
records and documents substantiating the current controverted relationship are dead." Id. 
Because of these difficulties, the court held "that defendants would be disadvantaged if 
plaintiff were allowed to prosecute its claims." Id. 
Numerous other courts have stated that the loss of evidence due to another party's 
unreasonable delay constitutes injury sufficient to apply laches. See e.g., Fontana v. 
Steenson, 929 P.2d 336, 339 (Or. App. 1996) (prejudice may be shown "by showing that a 
plaintiffs delay caused the loss of critical documentary evidence"); Maletis, Inc. v. Schmitt 
Forge, Inc., 870 P.2d 865, 868 (Or. App. 1994) ("prejudice may take the form of a 
disadvantageous change in position, or a loss of witnesses or documents"); Anderson v. 
Anderson, 585 P.2d 938, 947 (Haw. 1978) (stating that laches applies when, "'during 
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inexcusable delay, the evidence has become obscured and, under the circumstances of the 
case, it is too late to ascertain the merits of the controversy'" (citation omitted)). 
In this case, the Canal Company faces similar disadvantages. Due to the passage of 
so many years, records have been lost or inadvertently misplaced, witnesses' memories have 
faded, and key witnesses have died. (R. 65-67.) Because of the loss of so much evidence, 
the Canal Company has not been able adequately respond to the State Engineer's allegations. 
Additionally, the State Engineer's only support for its motion to dismiss is a document of 
questionable evidentiary value. For over twenty-seven years, the Canal Company believed 
that its objection wras valid and would be considered in the general adjudication. It has now 
acted for over thirty years on the assumption that its objection was timely. For the State 
Engineer now to seek dismissal of the Canal Company's claims is obviously inequitable. 
Because both elements of the laches exist, this Court could uphold the district court's ruling 
on this alternative basis. 
C. The District Court's Decision can be Affirmed Under the Alternative 
Equitable Doctrine of Waiver by the State Engineer 
The equitable doctrine of waiver provides an additional ground upon which this Court 
could uphold the district court's decision should it determine that the district court 
improperly interpreted § 73-4-11. As has been mentioned earlier, "'[a] waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.'" 
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass % 857P.2d935,942 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 311-12 (1936)). Waiver may be 
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inferred by "the totality of the circumstances." Id. Silence may constitute waiver if "there 
is some duty or obligation to speak." Id. at 940 (quotation and citation omitted). By its 
silence for more that twenty-seven years, the State Engineer has waived his right to seek 
dismissal of the Canal Company's objection. 
The State Engineer has a statutory duty to aid the court in the general adjudication. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1(1), -14 (1989 & Supp. 2003). It was therefore the State 
Engineer's duty to monitor the responses and objections to the Proposed Determination, at 
least within some reasonable time. However, the State Engineer apparently failed to comply 
with this obligation. Just as there is a time limit on when a water claimant may protest the 
proposed determination, there should be some reasonable time limit within which the State 
Engineer must challenge the objection and hearing be had regarding the same. 
In addition, the State Engineer has acted differently concerning the untimely 
complaints of other water users. In several cases, the State Engineer answered objections and 
requested that the proposed determination be modified or that an addendum be added to the 
proposed determination pursuant to those objections. Each of these objections, like the Canal 
Company's, was filed after the expiration of the ninety-day objection period. Despite the 
lateness of these objections, however, the State Engineer requested that each objection be 
fully or at least partially considered on the merits. (R. 149.) The State Engineer has not 
afforded the Canal Company the same deference to its meritorious objection.17 For reasons 
17The State Engineer has never challenged the veracity of Jack Barnett's affidavit 
testimony, presented in support of the Canal Company's objection to the reduction of the 
Canal Company's water right to 60 rather than the necessary 80 cfs. 
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unknown to the Canal Company, the State Engineer has determined to treat the Canal 
Company differently by seeking to dismiss its objections without consideration on the merits 
while recommending that other untimely objections be incorporated into the proposed 
determination. By waiving his right to reject untimely objections submitted by other 
claimants, the State Engineer has also waived his right to reject the Canal Company's 
objections. 
By failing to act for over twenty-seven years when he had a duty to do so, the State 
Engineer has waived his opportunity to dismiss the Canal Company's objections for 
untimeliness.18 Because waiver is an appropriate equitable remedy, this Court should uphold 
the district court's decision even if it determines that other reasons do not. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED SUPPLEMENTS TO 
THE OBJECTION AS AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL OBJECTION 
In its memorandum decision, the district court ruled that the Canal Company's initial 
objection was timely filed and that "the 'supplemental filings'... [were] merely amendments 
and/or specifications to the original filing." (R. 443.) According to § 73-4-10, the district 
court has the "power to allow amendments to any petition, statement or pleading." If this 
Court determines that the Canal Company's original pleading was timely, then the district 
court's decision to consider the Canal Company's subsequent objections as amendments to 
the original should also be affirmed because the district court did not abuse his discretion. 
18It is ironic that the State Engineer is attempting to dismiss an objection that was, 
according to the State Engineer, 93 days late by filing a motion to dismiss twenty-seven 
years, or over 9855 days, later. 
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See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, Tf 31, 84 P.3d 1154. 
According to the State Engineer, "the major reason for the statutory time limit for 
filing objections is so water users have notice of issues that affect their water rights 
[and] "[supplemental' or 'amended' objections that raise new issues subvert this purpose."19 
Appellant Brief, 34. The State Engineer asserts that §§ 73-4-11 and 73-4-10 act as a bar to 
new issues raised by "cunning water users."20 Id. Additionally, the State Engineer asserts 
that the word "objection" or "protest" does not appear in the list of amendable documents in 
§ 73-4-10. The State Engineer's arguments are hypertechnical and cannot withstand close 
scrutiny. 
In similar situations, this Court has held that trial courts may permit amendments to 
claims even though certain statutory time limits have passed. In Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 
632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981), the dispute concerned "a defect on the face of the summons 
19Of course, if this is the main purpose for the statutory time limit, then it also supports 
the conclusion that the statutory time limit exists to ensure that all claimants receive notice 
of the proposed determination at the same time and that all objections are required to be filed 
at the same time also, i.e., ninety days after mailing, so that water users all promptly "receive 
notice of issues that affect their water rights." Appellant Brief, 34. As has already been 
mentioned, this Court has held that another purpose of the general adjudication is to avoid 
piecemeal litigation. See Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co. v. Burton, 70 Utah 239, 259 P. 408, 
410 (1927). The practice of the State Engineer to distribute the Proposed Determination 
randomly over several years does exactly the opposite. 
20
 All the State Engineer needs to do to prevent "cunning water users" from amending 
their objection is to timely file an answer to such objections. The goal of general 
adjudications should not be to avoid adjudications of the merits of water user's claims. On 
the contrary, the goal is to achieve the most correct and accurate adjudication of all rights in 
a particular drainage area. All the Canal Company desires is the right to have its day in court 
and to attempt to prove it needs 80 cfs. 
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served on defendant." On appeal, this Court noted that "Rule 4(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure specifically allows an amendment to be made to the summons 'at any time."' Id. 
at 881. Even though the statute of limitations ran prior to the filing of the motion to amend, 
"the amendment relates back to the initial summons." Id. at 882. In support of this holding, 
this Court noted that Rule 15(e), concerning amendments to complaints, also permits 
amendments to "relate back to the initial filing of the complaint . . . notwithstanding the 
intervening running of a statute of limitations." Id. Such rules are "liberally construed to 
afford litigants their day in court on the merits of their claim." Id. Finally, this Court stated 
"[i]n the absence of prejudice, it is appropriate to pursue that policy which favors resolution 
of disputes on the merits rather than technicalities." Id. According to this Court, 
amendments should be liberally allowed in the interest of justice and relate back to the initial 
filing even though statutory time periods have run. 
In Lawson v. McBride, 71 Utah 239, 264 P. 727 (1928), a water user appealed a 
decree entered by a district court concerning the extent and nature of the water user's water 
right. On review, this Court reversed the decree based on its determination that it was against 
the clear weight of the evidence. Id. at 729. Additionally, this Court held that the district 
court "erred in not permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint" to conform to the 
evidence. Id. In that case, the district court abused its discretion by denying the water user 
to opportunity to amend. In this case, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion. 
Reviewing motions to amend, Utah's appellate courts have suggested several factors 
to consider including: "(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and 
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(3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party." Atcitty v. Bd. ofEduc. of the San Juan 
County Sck Dist, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In this case, amendments to 
the initial objection were filed in 1993 and 1999; however, no proceeding had taken place 
since the initial objection was filed and the general adjudication was in the exact same 
procedural posture when those amendments were filed. Additionally, there is no resulting 
prejudice to the responding party. The State Engineer is not prejudiced by any of these 
amendments because the State Engineer is not a water user competing for the same water 
source and has no right or interest that would be affected by amending the Canal Company's 
objection. Indeed, the State Engineer failed to act for twenty-seven years, indicating his 
disinterest in the Canal Company's position. In addition, no other claimant in the general 
adjudication will be affected.2 ] The State Engineer has admitted that no one else has obj ected 
to the Canal Company's water user claim. (R. 454:150:3-4.) Because no one was harmed, 
there was no reason for the district court not to allow the Canal Company's amendments. 
Section 73-4-10 places no limitations on the timing, subject, or number of 
amendments that can be permitted by the district court, though it clearly bestows on the 
district court the discretion to allow amendments. Amendments to objections, like 
amendments to summonses and complaints, should be liberally granted to allow claimants' 
objection to be heard on the merits. Because the statute allows for amendment, and because 
analogous cases require courts to allow such amendments, the district court did not abuse its 
2
 indeed, neither of the other two water users who appeared in the proceeding below 
bothered to object. 
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discretion in allowing the Canal Company's subsequent objections to relate back to the initial 
filing. Therefore, the district court's decision should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the decision of the district court. All the Canal Company 
seeks is its day in court and the opportunity to prove the need to continue to receive the water 
it is entitled to under its 1952 and 1969 claims. The State Engineer's recent change from 
accepting objections regardless of when filed demonstrates a shift away from the goals of the 
general adjudication and is in apparent contradiction of the State Engineer's role to correctly 
apportion Utah's scarce and valuable water resources among competing users. 
Although the State Engineer apparently may prosecute general adjudications at any 
pace he desires, general adjudications cannot be endlessly delayed by him without certain 
consequences. When the State Engineer chooses to wait twenty-seven years to seek 
dismissal of an objection on a technical procedural ground, he must know that valuable 
evidence that may excuse or explain the reason for the initial untimely filing will invariably 
be lost (including crucial first-person testimony). The district court reached the appropriate 
remedy, allowing the objection proceed on the merits. For the foregoing reasons, this Court 
should affirm the district court's memorandum decision. 
Dated this ^^oay^of March, 2004, SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
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C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS 
73-4-3 Procedure for action to determine rights —Notice to and list of 
claimants —Manner of giving notice of further proceedings --Duties of 
engineer --Survey --Notice of completion. 
Upon the filing of any action by the state engineer as provided in Section 73-
4-1, or by any person or persons claiming the right to the use of the waters of 
any river system, lake, underground water basin, or other natural source of 
supply, which involves a determination of the rights to the major part of the 
water of such source of supply or the rights of ten or more of the claimants of 
such source of supply, the clerk of the district court shall notify the state 
engineer that such suit has been filed. The state engineer then shall give notice 
to the claimants by publishing notice once a week for two consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper designated by the court as most likely to give notice to such claimants. 
The notice shall set forth that: such an action has been filed; the name of the 
action and the name and location of the court in which the action is pending; the 
name or description of the water source involved; and shall require claimants to 
the use of water therefrom to notify the state engineer within 90 days from the 
date notice is given of their names and addresses. After the expiration of 90 days 
the state engineer shall prepare a list which shall include the names and 
addresses of all claimants then of record m his office and all claimants who have 
notified the state engineer of their addresses, and this list shall be certified 
by the state engineer as complete and filed with the clerk of the court. The court 
upon petition may by order permit the addition of names and addresses to this list 
at any time during the pendency of the action, and the clerk of the court may, 
without court order, upon notice from the claimant note any change of address. If 
any claimant appears in this action by an attorney, the clerk shall note on the 
list the address of the attorney. After the list is filed by the state engineer, 
notice of further proceedings, after service of summons, may be given without 
court order by mailing a copy thereof to the persons listed at the addresses 
listed and by mailing a copy thereof to any attorney of record for any such 
person, and notice may be given to such listed persons and to all other claimants 
by publication m the manner and for the time prescribed by order of the district 
court. When such statement or list shall have been filed, the state engineer shall 
begin the survey of the water source and the ditches, canals, wells, tunnels, or 
other works diverting water therefrom; and as soon as this survey has been 
completed, the state engineer shall file notice of completion with the clerk and 
give notice by registered mail or by personal service to all claimants whose names 
appear on the list that the survey has been completed and that their claims are 
due within 90 days from the date of notice, and within 90 days after such service 
of such notice each claimant must file a written statement with the clerk of the 
court setting forth his respective claim to the use of such water. Notice given by 
mail shall be complete when the notice is mailed. When such a suit has been filed 
by the state engineer as provided by Section 73-4-1, or by any person or persons 
involving the major part of the waters of any river system, lake, underground 
water basin, or other source of supply, or the rights of ten or more of the water 
claimants of such source of supply, whether such suit is filed prior to or after 
the enactment hereof, it shall be the duty of the state engineer upon receiving 
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notice thereof to examine the records of his office with respect to the water 
source involved, and if they are incomplete to make such further investigation and 
survey as may be necessary for the preparation of the report and recommendation as 
required by Section 73-4-11. In all such cases the court shall proceed to 
determine the water rights involved m the manner provided by this chapter, and 
not otherwise. 
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 22; R.S. 1933, 100-4-3; L. 1935, ch. 105, § 1; 1939, 
ch. 112, § 1; C. 1943, 100-4-3; L. 1943, ch. 107, § 1; 1948 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 
1; 1979, ch. 252, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adjudication of rights. 
Jurisdiction and venue. 
Private suits. 
Procedure. 
Written statement. 
Adjudication of rights. 
The statute cleacly contemplates that the individual rights of each claimant shall 
be adjusted and adjudicated. Huntsville Irrigation Ass'n v. District Court, 72 
Utah 431, 270 P. 1090 (1928) . 
In action to quiet title to water rights in Virgin River water system, court did 
not err m also determining rights to Summit Spring, where all parties sought 
determination of spring rights, no useful purpose would be served m compelling 
retrial thereof, and variance with respect to whether spring was part of river 
water system was not objected to. St. George & Wash. Canal Co. v. Hurricane Canal 
Co., 93 Utah 262, 72 P.2d 642 (1937). 
In a general det ermmation suit the rights to the use of water may be determined 
not only as between and among the claimants and users on one side and the state of 
Utah on the other, but also as between and among all the claimants and users 
thereof. In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956); 
Huntsville Irrigation Ass'n v. District Court, 72 Utah 431, 270 P. 1090 (1928). 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS 
73-4-10 Amendment of pleadings --Extensions of time. 
The court shall have power to allow amendments to any petition, statement or 
pleading; to extend as provided m this title the time for filing any statement of 
claim; and to extend, upon due cause shown, the time for filing any other 
pleading, statement, report or protest. 
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 31; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 100-4-10. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Complaint, in action by alleged prior appropriator to quiet his title to all the 
waters of a stream, may be amended to conform to the evidence. Lawson v. McBride, 
71 Utah 239, 264 P. 727 (1928). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-4-10, UT ST § 73-4-10 
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through 
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003 
(Federal Cases). 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS 
73-4-11 Report and recommendation by engineer to court. 
Within thirty days after the expiration of the 60 days allowed for filing 
statements of claims, the state engineer shall begin to tabulate the facts 
contained m the statements filed and to investigate, whenever he shall deem 
necessary, the facts set forth m said statements by reference to the surveys 
already made or by further surveys, and shall as expeditiously as possible make a 
report to the court with his recommendation of how all rights involved shall be 
determined. 
After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the surveys, records, 
and files, and after a personal examination of the river system or water source 
involved, if such examination is deemed necessary, the state engineer shall 
formulate a report and a proposed determination of all rights to the use of the 
water of such river system or water source, and a copy of the same shall be mailed 
by regular mail to each claimant with notice that any claimant dissatisfied 
therewith may within ninety days from such date of mailing file with the clerk of 
the district court a written objection thereto duly verified on oath. The state 
engineer shall distribute the waters from the natural streams or other natural 
sources m accordance with the proposed determination or modification thereof by 
court order until a final decree is rendered by the court; provided, if the right 
to the use of said waters has been theretofore decreed or adjudicated said waters 
shall be distributed in accordance with such decree until the same is reversed, 
modified, vacated or otherwise legally set aside. 
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 32; R.S. 1933, 100-4-11; L. 1937, ch. 130, § 1; C. 
1943, 100-4-11. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Compiler's Notes. --Section 73-4-5 allows ninety days for filing statements of 
claims, not sixty days as set out m the first paragraph of this section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
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Claim No_ /»<£ 
F.Ied J 9 ^ 3 L 2 -
Rec By_ X° rt? 
Rec $2 50 fee_ MllS 
STATEMENT OF WATER USERS CLAIM 
TO DILIGENCE RIGHTS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Claim to surface water by right of use prior to March 12 1903 is hereby made and filed with the State Engineer, together 
with a filing fee of $250 and submitted in accordance with Sections 100 2 14 and 100 5-15 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as 
amended by the Session Laws of 1949 
1 Name of Claimant rTr*enriYer Canal G 
2 Postoffice address 
u»i ui.jjur atari X-
Y STATE WHETHER 
Tnrsnrpp  
OR NOT INCORPORATED) 
DRlhftr-h T-irlvrftll (prfffliriant) 0.K« Anderson (Sflfsrfttary) 
(IP A COMPANY GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT A#D I SECRETARY) 
3 Name of particular spring, spring area, stream or tributary from which water is diverted 
\s r.-rnan P-tv^r in Emery _County 
4 Nature, A m o u nt 
and Annual Period of 
Use (by month and 
Irrigation 
Mining 
Domestic 
Mumcipal 
Stockwatermg 
Power 
Sec Ft 
Sec Ft. 
Sec Ft 
Sec Ft 
Sec Ft 
Sec Ft. 
6JQ fromHarjahJL5 tolToy 3, 
from to 
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from to 
20 from Jan 1 
from 
Ac Ft 37*480 
Ac Ft 
Ac Ft 
Ac Ft 
toDQG 50 Ac Ft W* 800 
to Ac Ft «-- - *. 
(STRIKE OUT ONES NOT NEEDED) 
(IF FOR USE OTHER THAN HERE LISTED SET FORTH IN BLANK SPACE) 
5 Direct Flow Appropriation 
(ajjgoint of diversion from spring spring area stream or tributary (This and point of rediversion must be described with 
reference to U S Government survey corner) (Strike words not needed ) 
L o r t h 6 0 ^ 0 * Eas t 4540 f t . from the Southwest Corner of Sec t ion 1 7 , 
TrrwnKhip 20 , South , Range 16 E a s t S a l t Lake Base Mer id ian 
(b) Point of rediversion_ 
6 Appropriation for Storage Purposes 
(a) Name of reservoir if known by name. 
(b) 'Maximum capacity of reservoir m acre feet (Submit area-capacity table). 
(c) lear construction commenced , completed _, water first used_ 
(d) Location of reservoir (State legal subdivisions inundated in whole or part )_ 
(e) h reservoir located on or off stream from which water is claimed for storage purposes?. 
(f) Period of Storage Annual Period of Use. 
(GIVE BKQINNXNO AND ENDING DATES) 
Max depth in feet_ (g) At foil stage Area in acres inundated 
(h) If a yearly record of amount of water stored in past is available, give same, on sheet attached 
(i) *Is reservoir drained each year? No of fillings per year 
•See rules and regulations 
Paragraph 8~A 
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(j) Give following information as to feeder canal in case reservoir JS off source of supply, 
(1) Maximum carrying capacity of feeder caral in seond feet 
(2) Point of diversion of supply canal from stream or inbutarv (Must be described with reference to U. S Government 
survey corner) 
7. D i v e r t i n g W o r k s 
(a) Diverting dam nature type and dimensions n f P f t i n . f o r o f t d H o n c r n t f t ? G r a v i t y , L f m g t h 8 1 0 f t * H t » 1 3 f 
(b) flowing or pump well D.am X Dopth Y W i d t h 5 1 f t T 
Strike out word not needed) 
(L) Heddgate nature and ivpc of X 
(d) Water measuring device nature and type of C o n c r e t e T f e i r 
(e) Canal length 7 4 . 0 0 0 f t » W.drh at top 3 0 f t , Width at Hottnm 14= f t . 
Depth of \va te r____) .Grade per 1000 fee.t 0 * 3 5 8 Maximum cam mg capaut\ in 
second feet . Material through which canal parses S h q 1 c P n n l r > a n d Rfifttry S a n d y T.nnm 
(f) Flume Material S t e e l Length 8 5 f t * Width 5 0 i n . Depth nl Water 3 * 0 0 r . r ^ . ^ t 2 t T / l 0 0 T 
(g) Pumps Number .Type Capacity Head -
Make_ How operated _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
(h) Date when work on diverting system was first begun F e b * 2 3
 t I B 9 2 
(i) Nature of such work Timber-Rook F i l l e d Cribb Dam—Brush and Rocks 
(j) Date when diverting system was completed 18QQ 
(k) Date when water was first used A p r i l 1RR*| Quantity used . 
Area irrigated 1903 by surface waterJL_Q0 In 1935 by underground water 
(1) If canal or well has been enlarged, give date of enlargements and additional capacity A p r i l 1 9 1 0 ——25 n . f . a . 
8 Where Water Is Used for Irrigation Purposes 
(a) Area and legal subdivisions of land embracing area irrigated the first year (give dates) 
(b) Area and legal subdivisions of land embracing area irrigated each year thereafter (give dates) 
S ^ AhhanVmri S h ^ f t t 
(c) Date of last enlargement of irrigated area. 1903 
(d) Give area in each legal subdivision of land (40-acre tracts) irrigated at present time, if only parts of legal subdivisions 
are irrigated give acreage in each 40-acre legal subdivision (attach sheet if necessary) 
See attached Sheet 
(e) Character of soil irngdted?RTidy TiflBIP. depth, 8. X t « Character of subsoil G r a v e , ! 
(f) Kind of crops raised la<t year and acreage of p«ph Hay—600 Ac *
 t Grain—300 A c . f Cantalopes— 
300 A c . r Corn 160 _ • . Orchard—20 A c , Lelons—40 4o»P 55 Acres r i s a e l l a n e o u s 
Truok Products, fr^p 
(g) Maximum acreage of anous crops irrigated at any time during period of use JL&&5 i— 
(h) Minimum acreage of various crops irrigated at any time during period of use 1 2 7 5 . 
(i) Do you use water for irrigation outside the growing season7 ,
 UQ 
(1) If so, to what extent and purpose9 
(2) If for irrigation, what crops? 
(j) Is an> portion of the land listed as irrigated water-logged> H.Q.. 
If so, how much in each legal subdivision? 
(k) Is any portion of the land listed as irrigated drained by artificial means ' Ho , 
(1) Do you get water under a partnership ditch7 Tin If so, give names and addresses of partners and amount of 
land each irrigates at present ... • —.—__ 
9. Where Water Is Used for Power Purposes 
(a) Water wheels used No Type Actual Capacity of each — _ 
(b) Head under which each wheel operates. .Rated H P of each 
(c) Purpose for which power is used_ 
(d) Place or places where power is used 
(e) Point where water is returned to the natural stream (Must be described with reference to U S Government survey 
-cortter) 
10 W h e r e W a t e r Is U s e d for M i n i n g Purposes 
ta)~Na«qe o? mining distnct___ Name of Mine . 
(b) Kjnd of ore or ores mined 
(cX Purpose of Use 
(d) Point where unused water, if any, is returned to the natural stream (Must be described with reference to U. S 
Government survey corner ) _________ 
11. W h e r e W a t e r Is U s e d for Stock Watering* 
(a) Type of conserving works 
(1) Troughs, number and size W a t e r e d i n i r r i g a t i o n l a t a m ! d i t n r m s r u n n i n g t h r o u g h 
fields 
(2) Ponds, number, size and depth 
(3) Sumps, number, size and depth_ 
(b) Number of each kind of range stock wat-Mrl 2 0 0 0 C a t t l e — 5 0 0 0 S h e e t ) — 1 0 0 H o r s e s 
12 Where Water Is Used for Domestic and Municipal Purposes: 
(a) If for domestic use 
(1) Place or places by legal subdiv of 40 ac where used 
(2) Number of persons and families supplied _____ 
(3) Number of each kind of domestic stock watered (not included in par. 11) . 
(4) Total acreage of gardens and lawns irrigated (not included m par 8)_ 
8Q /.eras 
(b) If for municipal use 
(1) Name of city or town supplied (Trflfln "RlVftr C i t f f -
(2) Population 1 2 0 0 
(3) Approximate quantity of water in gallons per day used _L_kj-L 
13. W h e r e W a t e r is U s e d for a Purpose N o t above Enumerated . (Descr ibe in deta i l , in space b e l o w the 
nature and extent of such use . ) 
14. W a t e r measurement was made by C u r r e n t M e t e r o n _ day of AttgUgfr 
^l)>i_________J_______a m e t h o d and reported in detail o n attached statement. 
SIGNATURE OF CliAUtCANT 
STATE OF UTAH 
(To be used if claimant is an individual) 
COUNTY O F E m « r y 
, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is 
the claimant whose name appears hereon, that he has read the foregoing statement of his claim and knows the cont^its thereof, 
that he has signed the same, and that the answers set forth therein are true to his best knowledge and belief. 
SIGNATURE OCP CLAIMANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 19 
My commission expires NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH J ^ (To be used if claimant is a corporation, 
COUNTY OF £/??&**¥ I co-iwrrtrrcrskip or asyxMatinn) 
/JP//>+/* T / / /?{ -> Jj> // , being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is the 
__of the organization above named, that he makes this certification 
on behalf of said organization, that he has read the foregoing statement of claim and knows the contents thereof, and that he has 
sigc-d the name of said organization to said statement, that the answers set forth therein are true to his best knowledge and 
W
"
1
- £r^AP^J~<Uu+trfJ0P Xl_ 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 73-5-13 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 5. ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION 
Copyright © 1953, 1971, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985 by The Allen Smith 
Company. Copyright © 1987-1996 by Michie, a division of Reed 
Elsevier Inc and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
73-5-13 Notice of claim to surface or underground water not otherwise represented — Filing — 
Form -- Information and proof required — Corrections — Prima facie evidence of rights. 
All claimants to the right to the use of water, including both surface and underground, whose rights 
are not represented by certificates of appropriation issued by the state engineer, by applications 
filed with the state engineer, by court decrees or by notice of claim heretofore filed pursuant to law, 
shall file notice of such claim or claims with the state engineer on forms furnished by him setting 
forth such information and accompanied by such proof as the state engineer may require, including 
but not limited to the following: 
The name and post-office address of the person making the claim; the quantity of water claimed in 
acre-feet; and/or the rate of flow in second feet; the source of supply; the priority of the right, the 
location of the point of diversion with reference to a United States land survey corner, the place, 
nature, and extent of use, the time during which the water has been used each year and the date 
when the water was first used. A notice of claim may be corrected by filing with the state engineer a 
corrected notice designated as such and bearing the same number as the original claim. No fees 
shall be charged for filing a corrected notice of claim. 
Such notices of claim, or claims, as provided in this section, shall be prima facie evidence of claimed 
right or rights therein described. 
History: C. 1943, 100-5-15, added by L 1949, ch. 97, § 3; 1955, ch. 160, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — A Primer of Utah Water Law, 5 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 165 (1984). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-5 -13 
UT ST § 73-5-13 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr (C) West 2004 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
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J. Craig Smith (4143) 
David B. Hartvigaea (5390) 
Brian C Cheney (8881) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East Soulh Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF RLOHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF 
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE 
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDINO 
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN 
UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF JACK A HARNETT 
Code Nog. 91 and 92 
Civil No. 8598 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF EMERY ) 
JACK BARNETT, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the President of Barnett Intermountain Water Consulting, a water rights and 
water resources firm, which I founded in 1981. For a period in my career I was employed as an area 
engineer in the Office of the State Engineer for Utah. I am also a Professional Engineer, and a 
Professional Geologist, duly licensed in the state of Idaho. 
2. I have been retained by the Green River Canal Company as a consultant and expert 
witness in another action bzought by the Canal Company. In connection with those services, I have 
inspected the Canal Company's diversion works and canal system on several different occasions in 
I13373.GK255.0QS 
EQ'd TdlDl 
the last few years. I have observed its operation and discussed the same with many of iU officers, 
directors, and shareholders* 
3, On May 5f 1999, I had the flows in the Canal Company's raceway and canal 
measured. The flows in the raceway were measured at 853 cfe and the flows in the canal were 
measured at 79.4 cfe. The remaining flows in fee raceway, which amounted to 773.6 cfe, were being 
diverted to Mr. Lee Thayn-
4, It is my opinion that it is currently necessary, and has been necessary for as long as 
fee canal system has been in its present configuration, for the canal to have approximately 80 cubic 
feet per second of water flowing in it during the irrigation season in order for the canal system to 
filiation properly. 
5, The Green River is extremely silt laden and the silt settles out rapidly as the water 
moving through the raceway and canal slows down. Therefore, frequent sluicing is essential to the 
operation of the canal. 
DATED this JL day of December, 2000. 
Jack A. Bamett, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this /-^day of December, 2000, 
mmm
 Notary Public I 
DQNA.BARNETT , 
10S West 500 Soutn, S utte 101 I 
Boumrlul, Utah 64010 . 
My Commission Expires | 
naroXOlSSDOS A ' N P ^ - V ^ January 30.2002 
Stale of Utah J 
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f>M <<>> 
N THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CARB0N STATE OF UTAH 
< THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION \ STATEMENT Or WATER 
F RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND ) USERS CLAIM 
IDERGROUNO, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE PRICE ( CODE NO SERIAL NO 
VER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER ( 91 294 
OM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS 1 
TH* CONFLUENCE OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS /
 M A P N O 144d 
CLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER 
UTAH 
>TE This blank is sent to you tn accordance with Utah Law The information called for herein will be uaed to con 
nun with the adjudication of water nghts on the above mentioned drainage area. All questions applicable to your claim 
»t be answered fully and one copy of this form must be f 'ed with the Clerk of the District Court it 
"
r
*
c e
 Utah, within sixty (60) days from date of service of the attached Notice A copy shall be 
d with rhe State Engineer State Capitol Salt Lake City Failure to file the attached Statement of the Water Users 
im widK die Clerk of the District Court widun the tune stated will forever bar and eatop you from asserting any right 
he use of water from said drainage area 
Name of Claimant G * * « n R i v « r C a n * 1 Company 
Interest Claimed F u * * 
A d d r e „ Green R i v e r , Utah $4525 
Name of particular spring spring area, stream well tunnel or drain from which water is diverted is 
Green River (Gravi ty Canal)
 tn &mery County 
Priority date claimed l o o t ) ^^
 w n e n w a t e r w s u firf, u je<j 
Date when work on diverting system was first *»egun Date when diverting system was completed 
Nature of work 
Class of Right (Indicate by X) 
(a) X Right to surface water initiated by beneficial use before 1903 Claim No ^ 
b) Right to underground water initiated before 1935 Claim No 
c) Right decreed by court, cite title of case 
d) Application filed, State Engineer s Office No Cert of App No 
e) Right acquired by adverse use prior to 1939 
Mature (Indicate by X) Amount and Annual Period of Use (by month & day) 
a ) X
 lrngJUI0n sec Ft 6 0 c * » from M f i r c h i5 to November 1 (boch ^ i n d > 
b ) X Stockwatenng Sec Ft 2 0 from January 1
 t 0 December 31 (both dates mcl ) 
) x Domestic Sec Ft I n c .
 from January 1 w December 3 1 < both dates md) 
I) Municipal Sec Ft from to (both dates incl ) 
) Sec Ft. from, to (both dates incl) 
rect Flow Appropriation (must be described with reference to U S Government Survey Corner) 
) Pome of divenion from spring spcing area, stream, well tunnel drain N * 1 9 5 0 f t . a n d W. 8 0 0 
ft. fron the SE Cor., Sec. 17, T20S, R16E, SLB6&. 
) Description of spring area 
) Point of rediversion or point of return to natural channel 
I If flow is intermittently diverted list by number or description, all rights involved 
terc water is used for irrigation purposes 
Area irrigated in legal subdivisions of land by 40-acre tract (Ail sources of water for same land or lands must 
. L . . . , . , CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCiUBLD. 
described in each instance bv name uc claim number) 
Do you get water under a ditch owned by severaJ users If so, give names of all users and 
ons of interest 
e water is used for Stockwatenng _ _ . „. ~ , « ~. , ^r, », 
„ w. , uc. A i L A 2,000 Cattle, 3,000 Sheep, 100 Horses 
dumber of each kind of stock watered • * ' r 
Ml sources of water for same stock (Describe by name or claim number) 
e water is used for Domestic „ 
iumber of families or their equivalent All sources of water for same use 
ribe by name ur claim number) 
VChere water is uted for Municipal Purposes 
(*) Name of city or town supplied Populiuoo 
Number of families Quantity of mater 
12 Where water is used for a purpose not above enumerated 
(a ) Nature of Use Extent of Lse 
13 Appropriation for Storage Purposes 
(a) Name of reservoir 
(b) Location of reservoir by legal subdixisions described by 40 at re traits 
(c) Maximum capacity of re-iervoir in aire feet Year const-urtion commenced 
Completed Water first used Is reservoir Wnjied on or off stream 
(d) Period of Storage from to (both date* i wl ) Period of use from 
to (both dates incl ) Maximum area in acres inund4ttJ Max depth in feet 
Average depth in feet Is reservoir drained each year Maximum number of fillings per 
year Is reservou used for equalizing purposes U feeder canal u used, give maximum 
carrying capacity in tec ft 
U Diverting Works 
(a) Surface water diverting dam Material composed of 
Max length Max height Max. widdi at bottom Max width 
at top 
(b) Underground water diverting works Is well flowing or pump Depth of well 
Diameter of well Length of drain Width of dram Depth of dram 
Diameter of drain Length of runnel Width of tunnel Height of tunnel 
Type of pump Capacity of pump 
(c) Surface and underground water conveying works Length of ditch to first place of use Width of 
ditch at top Width of ditch at bottom Depth of water Grade of 
ditch per 1000 it Material through which ditch paaaes Maximum lengdi of 
pipe line to first place of u« Diameter of pipe line Grade of pipe line per 
1000 feet 
15 The undersigned hereby enters his appearance and waives service of summons or other process 
STATE OF UTAH \ 
(SS (To be used if claimant is an individual) 
COUNTY OF ) 
being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is die claimant 
whose name appears hereon, that he haj read the foregoing statement of his claim and knows die contents thereof, that 
he has signed the same, and that the answers set forth uWein are true to his best knowledge and belief 
Signature of Claimant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me dus day of 19 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH \ 
(SS (To be used if claimant is a corporation or an estate) 
COUNTY OF E m e r y ) 
Joftft V e t ^ T S * J r . being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says uSat he is the 
P r e s i d e n t of the above claimant, daat he makes this certification on behalf of said 
claimant, that he has read the foregoing statement of claim and knows the contents thereof and that he hat signed the name 
of said claimant to utd statement that the answers set forth therein are true to bts best knowledge and belief 
Green River Canal Company 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6 t h day
 0( N o v e m b e r 1 9 69 
tye&zrrf President 
91-294 
9.20 a c s . in SEiNEi, 1.7 acs . in NEiSE-^, Sec. 20; 7.70 a c s . in N£4hE4, 9.00 ac s . 
in SEiNEi, 6.60 ac s . in SW*SE%, 0.20 ac . in N£*SE%, 24.30 acs . in NVtSE-4, 0.70 
ac. in NEiSWi, 22.40 acs . in SW*SE*, 23.30 acs . in b£%SVi, Sec. 29; 23.00 a c s . 
IK SEiNEi, 28.40 a c s . in KEiSLX, 1.10 ac s . in S£iS£*, Sec- 31; 4.7 a c s . in NWtNEi,, 
36.00 a c s . in NE&Wi, 9.30 a c s . in NW-tNVk, 17.70 a c s . in SEiNtf*, 35.70 acs . in 
SW^NVi, 7.20 acs . in NVISW%, Sec. 32; a l l in T20S, R16E, SLB6W. 15.20 acs . 
Lot 1 , 32.50 acs . Lot 2, 45.50 a c s . in Lot 3 , 8.50 a c s . Lot 4 , 4.60 a c s . Lot 9 , 
28.70 a c s . Lot 10, 11.8 a c s . Lot 11, Sec. 3; 4.20 a c s . Lot 16, 20.00 acs . Lot 20, 
0.70 ac . NWiSE*, 36.00 acs . in SE*S£4>, 31.80 acs . in SWifcE-a,, 4llC a c s . in SE*bW*, 
Sec. 4; 36.00 a c s . In NE-fcNE-t, 33.80 a c s . in HWiNEi, 16.00 a c s . in NciNW*, 37.70 
acs . in SEiNEi, 37.50 acs . in SWiNEi, 1.10 acs . in SEiNWi, 9.70 a c s . in NEfcSE*, 
33.50 a c s . in NV*S&fc, 1.70 a c s . in NEiSV*, 2.80 ac s . in SEtSE-i,, 27.80 a c s . in 
SViSE*. 9.20 acs . i s SEiSW-k, Sec. 9; 20.00 acs . in NViNE*, 31.60 acs . in NEiNW*, 
39.00 acs . in NWiNWi, 33.2C acs . in SW^tA, 38.OO a c s . in St-att^, 3o.20 acs . in 
SWiNVi, 22.70 a c s . i s NW^SEi, 40.00 a c s . in NEiSWi, 38.70 acs . in NVUSV*, 5.40 
acs . in SW&E3>, 34.30 acs . in SE&W-t, 25.70 acs . in SW*SV*, bee. 10; 20.70 a c s . 
in NEiNWi, 37.60 a c s . in NW*NW*, 0.4C ac . in SE*NWi, 5.70 acs . in SW*NV*, 8.50 
acs . in NWiSWi, 5.20 acs . in SU&Wi, bee. 15; 13.90 a c s . in NE*HE*, 29.50 acs . 
in NViNEi, 4.40 acs . in NEiNWi, 29.40 a c s . in SE*NE*, 16.20 acs . in SW*NE*, 
22.50 acs . in NEiSE^, 28.50 acs . in NV>SE^, 2.00 a c s . in Nh^ SW ,^ 35.50 a c s . 
in SEiSEi, 26.20 a c s . in SViSE*,, 0.20 a c s . in SEtSW*t Sec. lb; 23.00 acs . 
in KEUE^., Sec. 21, 3.50 acs . in NW N^Wi, 1.40 acs . in SW-**W„, b e e 22, a l l 
in T21S, R16E, SLB6&. Total of 1,443.J0 acres . 
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DEC 0 5 2003 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
FIRST ADDENDUM TO THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS 
PRICE RIVER AND LOWER GREEN RIVER DRAINAGE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF THE RIGHTS TO USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE 
THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE 
CONFLUENCE OF THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THE 
GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE 
SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH 
AREA 91 
ALL BOOKS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
afe 3fe afe afe 3(e 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS TO USE OF 
WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF 
THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF 
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING 
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH 
PRICE RIVER DRAINAGE (AREA 91-ALL) 
Civil No 690708598 (91-All) 
* * * * * 
NOTICE TO WATER USERS WITHIN THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DRAINAGE AREA 
This is your copy of the First Addendum to the Proposed Determination of Water Rights in Area 91, All Books, of the Price River 
Drainage The Proposed Determination, as modified by this First Addendum, is the State Engineer's report and recommendation to the Court. A copy of 
the Proposed Determination (as contained in several published books) and this Addendum will be on file with the Clerk of the Seventh District Court in 
Price, Utah Additional copies may be obtained from the Division of Water Rights at 1594 West North Temple, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, by 
paying the cost of printing 
You are hereby notified that under Section 73-4-11, Utah Code Annotated (1989), any claimant dissatisfied with the First Addendum to 
the Proposed Determination may object, but only as follows- The claimant must file with the Clerk of the Seventh District Court in Price, a written 
objection duly verified on oath. The objection must be filed within ninety (90) days after the claimant is served with the First Addendum to the Proposed 
Determination, and must reference Civil No 690708598 (91-All) The date of service is either the date the First Addendum was mailed to the claimant's 
address of record at the Office of the State Engineer, or the date the claimant picked up a copy of the First Addendum in person (in lieu of mailing) If a 
claimant receives copies by mail and in person, the earlier date of service begins the ninety day objection period A copy of the objection should also be 
sent to the Division of Water Rights at the mailing address shown below The objection may address only the irrigation duty as described in this First 
Addendum Objections may not address issues that could have been raised as to the unmodified Proposed Determination 
L Ward Wagstaff Jerry D Olds, P E 
Julie I Valdes State Engineer 
Assistant Attorneys General DIVISION OF WATER RIGH TS 
Attorneys for the State Engineer Price River Adjudication 
PO Box 146300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF THE RIGHTS TO USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF 
THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE 
PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE OF 
THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING THE 
DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH 
PROPOSED DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS 
IN THE PRICE RIVER AND LOWER GREEN RIVER 
DRAINAGE 
AREA 91, ALL BOOKS 
Civil No. 690708598 (91-ALL) 
Jerry D. Olds, State Engineer of the State of Utah, 
respectfully submits this report to the Court. 
1. Geographical Area Covered This General Adjudication 
includes all water sources, both surface and underground, 
within the Drainage Area of the Price River and the drainage 
area of the Green River from the confluence of the Price and 
Green Rivers to the confluence of the Green and Colorado 
Rivers excluding the drainage area of the San Rafael River in 
Utah. This Proposed Determination covers only those water 
rights in the Price River Drainage (Area 91) of the General 
Adjudication. Area 91 is shown on the index map immediately 
hereinafter. 
2. Duty of Irrigation Water. In response to certain 
objections to the Proposed Determinations regarding duty, the 
State Engineer has re-evaluated the duty in Area 91. The maps 
published herein present the boundaries and newly determined 
duties for Area 91. More detailed maps are available for 
review in the Price and Salt Lake City offices of the State 
Engineer. The calculation of duty contemplates many factors, 
including evapotranspiration, average precipitation, and 
application and conveyance losses. 
Because a water right is limited by the extent of its 
beneficial use, an irrigation right is limited by the acreage 
actually irrigated. The amount of water which may be diverted 
to irrigate the crops to maturity in a specific area is known as 
the duty. The duty per calendar year is measured at the point of 
diversion from the natural water source. The duty shown is 
based on efficiencies associated with flood irrigation practices. 
As irrigation practices change to improve irrigation efficiency, 
it is anticipated less water will be diverted. 
The State Engineer has determined that in the Price 
River drainage area, the application each year of more than the 
individually or generally established duty of water per acre is 
unnecessary and would not be a beneficial use of the excess 
water. 
3. This Proposed Determination of Water Rights was 
approved for publication on the _ ^ £ day of 
/ie^u ' , 2003. 
D^OLDS, P.E. JERRY 
tate Engineer 
'Scofield 
_T 
Hiawatha 
Location Map 
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J. Craig Smith (4143) 
David B. Hartvigsen (5390) 
Brian C.Cheney (8881) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF 
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE 
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING 
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN 
UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
HAROLD D. DONALDSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I was employed by the State of Utah in the Utah State Water Engineer's office, also 
known as the Division of Water Rights, from approximately 1952 to 1988. During the period of 
time from 1956 to 1988,1 was in charge of overseeing various general adjudication proceedings 
including the above-captioned general adjudication and was designated as the Directing Engineer 
over Adjudications in that office. 
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2. I was personally involved in preparing the proposed determinations of water rights 
in the various general adjudication proceedings. 
3. I was also personally involved in distributing the proposed determination books to 
the various water claimants. 
4. After the proposed determination was distributed to the water claimants, I was also 
personally involved in investigating and responding to any objections to the proposed determination 
by the water claimants. 
5. It was the policy of the State Engineer's office to investigate and answer each protest 
to the proposed determination and submit the answer thereto to the Attorney General's office, 
regardless of when it was filed. In numerous cases, the Attorney General's office did not act 
pursuant to our answer or recommendation but rather were unable to proceed due to lack of 
manpower. 
6. During my involvement in this and other General Adjudications, because the Attorney 
General's office was unable to prosecute the General Adjudications due to its heavy involvement 
in other litigation, objections filed after the expiration of the ninety day periods were accepted. If 
the State Engineer's office did not agree with the Objection, then the Objection was litigated on its 
merits even if untimely. The State Engineer's office sought to determine the water rights on their 
merits in order to make the final determination as accurate and correct as possible. 
7. I have reviewed the objections of the Green River Canal Company in the above 
captioned general adjudication and, in my opinion, the objections have merit due to the unique 
circumstances of the high silt load in the Canal and the Green River and thus additional water is used 
for the system to properly function in the way it has been historically, and the Objection should be 
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incorporated into the proposed determination by way of addendum, or should their merits be 
opposed, be heard by and decided by this Court on its merits. 
DATED this / day of December, 2000. 
Hardld D. Donaldson, Affiant \ ^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on t h i s / ^ day of December, 2000 
otar^ Public 
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